

NEW HORIZONS
IN
PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION

A SYMPOSIUM



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FOREWORD

In 1944 the Universities of Alabama, Georgia, and Tennessee, in conjunction with the Tennessee Valley Authority, launched the Southern Regional Training Program in Public Administration. The plan for the Training Program called for the selection of ten recent college and university graduates who would spend twelve months in study, the three summer months as interns in public offices over the region and the school year as graduate students at the three cooperating universities, one quarter at each. The first group of ten fellows, representing nine colleges and universities in seven different states, completed their internships in the summer of 1944 and entered the University of Alabama the following fall. As a feature of the Training Program for the fall quarter, six outstanding students and practitioners of public administration visited the University campus for lectures before student-faculty groups and for conferences with the fellows. Each speaker reduced his lecture to written form, and the six papers appear here as a permanent record of the series.

The authors of these papers need no introduction, for they are well known both in this country and abroad for their work in public administration. Nor do the problems selected for discussion require comment, for manifestly they are among the most important in the whole domain

of administration. The University of Alabama is pleased to have been the instrument through which the series was planned and the papers brought together in printed form.

New Horizons in Public Administration is the initial publication of the University of Alabama Press, which counts itself fortunate to have obtained this manuscript for its first book.

Roscoe C. Martin

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NEW HORIZONS IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

I

Legislative Responsibility for the Public Service

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The next major development in the improvement of administration depends on reform of American legislatures. The great need of public administration is release from the legislative strait jacket which has slowly developed over many years. The reform which is needed must start with a new view of the duty of legislative bodies to provide for the American people an effective agency of common action in a world where some degree of planned action seems destined to replace comfortable drift. While holding fast to ultimate executive responsibility to elected representatives, we must be prepared to open up a degree of freedom from detailed legislative control which has hardly been attained in any of the American states, or in Washington.

There has been common complaint by businessmen who have been in government service during the present crisis about the strangling network of restrictions, prohibitions, and limitations which have prevented them from doing an efficient job. Part of their complaint may be discounted as due to their unfamiliarity with the ways and means of adaptation to the technical requirements under which public business is done; part of it may

be discounted as failure to recognize that public business requires a degree of care in its performance that is not always necessary in private business. But much of it cannot be discounted. Over the decades one requirement after another has been imposed by law on the conduct of government affairs, one restriction on freedom of decision after another, one new application of these limitations after another by ever zealous auditors. The invigorating reversal of this process by an occasional housecleaning and simplification seldom seems to take place until a major crisis compels action. In consequence the efficient and sensible conduct of public affairs is often handicapped.

Everyone demands an efficient and economical government. My thesis is that we cannot secure such a government by sterilizing the managerial capacity of our public servants. We need, on the contrary, to free them to use their talents, and to supply incentives which will release their energy and imagination.

To secure this end will require almost a revolution in the lawmakers' conception of their duty to administration. The dominant concept for most of our history has been that of a watchful and suspicious master of a prodigal and wasteful servant who could not be trusted out of sight. The concept which is needed recognizes the administrative system as a partner in the firm—as an organized body of trained professional and technical officers, with a sense of responsibility and obligation, and with a corporate capacity to serve the public interest, unique and absolutely indispensable. To the extent that the public service presently falls short of this ideal concept, the legislature should accept the duty to provide conditions which will progressively mark its achievement.

Administrative Skill and the Political Art

A half century hence the historian of public administration in the United States will probably conclude that the two decades from 1920 to 1940 stand out as years of remarkable progress in the technique of administration. In this brief period budget procedures were firmly established and toward its close a more sophisticated philosophy of the function of a budget was formulated; the personnel experts perfected the techniques of job classification and the art of mass examination; the administrative analysts invented greatly improved procedures; the problem of the coordination of huge administrative organizations was recognized, even though we cannot say it was solved; planning won a place; and above all the nature of the task of overhead management was defined and better mechanisms for its operation were created.

Our experience in the present crisis has thrown up many striking exhibits of the high level of management capacity, public and private, which as a people we possess. The tremendous production of ships and instruments of warfare, of artificial rubber and high octane gasoline, of aircraft and air carriers is a mighty testimonial to managerial capacity. The organization of the expedition into North Africa, the operation of the Air Transport Command, the vast range of the Services of Supply are equally impressive evidences of management skill in military operations. The decentralized operation of the Selective Service System and of rationing boards, and the central coordination (through the Office of Defense Transportation) of the communication network of the country illustrate major triumphs of management capacity in the civilian field. Other examples would show varying de-

degrees of success and failure, but even in such difficult areas as the utilization of manpower and the effective coordination of federal, state, and local authorities in congested areas, there have been many ingenious applications of the managerial art.

These great advances in public administration since 1920 have not been balanced by equally substantial improvements in the art of legislation, with due regard to the contribution of legislative councils, reference libraries, and bill-drafting agencies. Our governmental system is out of balance, and increasing strains may be feared unless the policy-forming branch of government, to which the policy-executing branch owes full responsibility, can be lifted to a higher level of performance. Our technical capacity in public administration has outrun our understanding of the wisest—and safest—means for taking advantage of what administration can contribute to the public interest.

In broad terms the problem I am suggesting is the old one of reconciling democratic institutions with a professional administrative corps. As we face the staggering problems of reconversion and the subsequent maintenance of an economy of substantially full employment, it is certain that we must depend heavily upon the disinterested professional and technical capacity of the public service. It is equally certain that we intend to maintain our democratic institutions and democratic control of our governmental mechanism.

Changing Character of Legislative Responsibilities for Administrative Performance

Democratic theory and practice vest important responsibilities in American state legislatures for the public

service. They are of long standing, indeed now traditional. State legislatures decide what tasks the state will undertake, and to what agency they will be assigned. Legislatures provide the finances, in such terms as they see fit. They establish a financial audit, and may investigate the conduct of the work. They sometimes lay down procedures, especially where important private interests are affected. They confer power and impose such limitations on the exercise of power as they deem wise. These are the formal descriptions of the duties of legislative bodies, to which can be added a host of informal relationships between representatives and officials, institutional and personal, public and private, known and unknown, which underlie the constitutional prescriptions.

In broad perspective the character of the connections between the legislative and administrative branches of state governments has changed drastically over a half century. State governments in the 1890's did relatively little; what they did was relatively simple. Legislators could readily grasp the task to be done and understand the consequences of what they authorized. In a more tightly integrated economy in which mass employment or unemployment, health or disease, prosperity or destitution, crime or public order depend upon interrelated public policies concerning taxation, public works, housing, labor, education, and health, the consequences of legislation are less ready to grasp and the application of policy to the particular case much less easy to define and to control.

The function of a legislative body in an American state toward its administrative system has consequently changed as the character of our economy has evolved; and it is important to seize upon the essential feature of the

change. It is this. The details of the business of government have escaped the competence of legislative committees and chairmen; the possibility of deciding policy by settling details, once perhaps feasible, has disappeared; and in the future, legislatures perforce must deal with administration on the basis of principle and generality if they are to deal with it effectively and in the public interest.

It is no longer possible for state legislatures to supervise administration in the familiar terms of the nineteenth century. It will be increasingly impossible in the last half of the twentieth century, now almost in sight. State legislatures and Congress must be prepared to forego the attempt to act in the capacity of a board of directors energetically running the business. They can be most useful to the American people by concentrating their effort on the study and general formulation of broad public policies, on the education of the voters with reference to these policies, on the establishment of an administrative structure to which should be given powers and responsibilities adequate to enable it to operate effectively, and on everlasting watchfulness to see to it that officials remain responsive to public sentiment.

This theory of relationships has already become established practice in one important branch of public administration—the American school system. Boards of education usually confine their activity to general matters of policy, educational, fiscal, managerial, and even here they expect as a matter of course to have the benefit of recommendations by the superintendent of schools. The detailed organization, direction, and supervision of the schools, including the appointment of teachers, are left to the superintendent.

The same theory prevails in the more than five hundred cities operating under the council manager plan of government, although theory and practice are not always synonymous. Nevertheless, the idea that the job of "running" the affairs of the city is one which an elected city council, even though its numbers are small, ought to abjure, is widely held in these cities and is steadily strengthening.

I do not advocate the exact analogy of the council manager plan as the ideal form of government for American states. I do, however, urge the state legislatures to abandon, as many city councils and most boards of education have abandoned, the attempt to supervise state administration in detail, or to control its organization and operations in detail.

Legislative Handicaps to Good Administration

Two reasons may be suggested, among others, for the partial failure of state legislatures in their dealings with administration. On the one hand, they have often attempted to do too much; on the other, they have sacrificed long-run considerations to immediate, local, or personal advantage.

Legislatures tend to do too much—more than they can do intelligently and more than is necessary to ensure administrative responsibility and competence. There is too much in the statutes dealing with administrative organization and procedures. The legislature makes decisions about the internal arrangement of departments and institutions which are more effectively determined by the officials who have to manage them. Some legislatures still make itemized appropriations, thus denying management the opportunity to utilize resources most ef-

fectively, and by necessary implication transferring much administrative power to auditors. Some legislatures still try to deal with particular local situations or special problems by local or special legislation, as, for example, with respect to fish and game laws in New England, and elsewhere in the organization of county offices. Here the legislature in effect splits up into county delegations, and wastes precious time which needs to be devoted to the larger problems of the state. The time of too many legislators is still mortgaged in dealing with the pay and status of state and institutional employees. In the informal rather than the formal life of state legislatures there are still attempts to influence the decision on a particular case pending before an administrative officer, on the basis of private considerations rather than general principles.

These comments must be balanced against the great improvements which can be found in many states. Bill-drafting agencies have made a valuable contribution to public administration by stressing the general rather than particular provisions of statutes; most appropriation acts are now lump sum, resting on itemized budgets; job classification has introduced some order in the personnel structures of a number of states, and a minority have reasonably effective personnel systems. Substantial progress has thus been made in rescuing legislative bodies from administrative details, and the operation of the public business has been improved as a result. There is still much to do.

When I argue further that legislatures fail to do their full duty by administration because they tend to sacrifice long-run considerations to short-term, special, and local interests, I refer to a failure shared by many other pub-

lic and private agencies. Legislatures, however, have a special charge to conserve the general interests of the community, and to look beyond the horizons of the present to the concerns of the future. In their hands rests the duty of defining the general interest, so far as may be possible—the task of safeguarding the civil liberty, health, education, security, and opportunity of all citizens.

To this end representative bodies contribute first of all the formulation of public policy. They must also, however, lay the foundations for the effective *administration* of this policy. It is at this point that some legislatures have neglected the lessons which the cumulative experience of the last quarter century has made clear. Not fully appreciating the cost in human losses, far more remote than immediate personal or political advantage, legislators have at times set up hindrances to good organization, have permitted partisanship to run unchecked, have indulged in hostile investigations not concerned with the good of the public service, and have refused the means by which alone the executive branch could perform the tasks laid upon it by law and by public demand. In the long and ever recurring struggle for party victory, the administrative system too often has been an unfortunate victim.

A Policy about Administration

The public business has suffered, in short, as a consequence of the lack of policy or plan about administration. Lacking an accepted program or standard, legislators naturally consider any proposal affecting the management of public affairs in the light of its immediate or its professed purposes. Consistency with existing provisions

of law and the long-range consequences of the precedent are too often neglected. The history of administrative adjudication, the scope of administrative discretion, and the extent of judicial review of administrative acts are three fields in which, among others, lack of a policy has produced unfavorable results. Without invidious distinction, the New York State Assembly has been notable in its efforts to develop sound standards for its own guidance.¹

Intelligent and consistent action about administration by legislative bodies, whose membership is constantly changing and whose leadership in many states shifts from one party to another, requires a standard by which specific proposals can be measured. In its first formulation such a standard would doubtless be severely limited to a few simple propositions of good administration concerning which there could be little difference of opinion. These propositions, indeed, could be pulled out of current practice, representing the level of achievement already implicit in the administrative statutes.

The very process of stating clearly an existing implicit policy might in itself confirm and strengthen the policy. Present standards would be brought out into the open, where they would be more readily available for application to new proposals. They would also become objects of public discussion and would win public support so far as the public was prepared to accept them. The statement of standards would doubtless reveal some shortcomings, which, when once called to attention, would be corrected by further expressions of legislative policy

1. See for illustration the successive reports of the New York State Commission for the Revision of the Tax Laws; and the report by Robert M. Benjamin, *Administrative Adjudication in the State of New York* (1942).

about administrative organization and procedures. They could be compared in any state with the standards prevailing in other states, and with the doctrines of professional students in this field.

No state, to my knowledge, has undertaken to formulate either the policy actually implicit in its existing administrative legislation, or the standards toward which such legislation should be bent. The analysis of the statutes of any state would readily reveal present standards and typical deviations from them. The standards would comprise a series of generalizations about such matters as departmental organization, allocation and delegation of authority, competence, operating methods, protection to private persons and interests through procedural guarantees, official discretion, and responsibility.

To become most effective such an analysis should be undertaken at the direction or at least with the support of legislative leaders. It is the kind of job which a state university is well equipped to perform. Since the issues involved in good administration are not usually partisan in nature, the leaders of all parties and groups might be equally ready to lend aid to this enterprise. Its accomplishment would be a pioneering venture which might contribute heavily to the future of good administration.

Legislative Organization to Facilitate Observance of Administrative Policy

Most legislative bodies lack an effective organization for the discharge of their own duties. In substance their organization is about the same as it was a century ago. They have gradually built up subsidiary aides

in the form of reference libraries and bill-drafting services; but with a few exceptions the task of internal legislative leadership has not yet been successfully engineered. One consequence has been the dominant position of legislative leadership acquired by American governors.

Whether or not representative assemblies in a democratic state should, after all, expect to find their leadership in the executive branch is an open question. It falls outside the range of this paper. I assume the point of view, however, that the full achievement of the democratic ideal of self-government requires an independent, intelligent, and vigorous legislative body. I assert a further proposition which may be controversial, that legislative bodies generally are less independent, intelligent, and vigorous than convinced democrats would desire.

I put forward these statements in order to lay the groundwork for a brief examination of the problem, how can legislatures be best organized to put into effect whatever standards of administration they may wish to impose upon the executive branch. The essential requirement is to establish a central crossroads over which all prospective legislation bearing on administration must pass, and a reviewing agency of some weight to inspect such legislation in the light of accepted standards. Doubtless a variety of specific means needs to be devised to meet different situations. The Judiciary Committee or the Rules Committee in some legislatures, the Legislative Council in others, perhaps a new Committee on Administrative Legislation in still others would perform this service effectively. Consideration by a bill-drafting bureau or reference library would be desirable

to check on technical language, but these agencies could not be expected to carry the load of negotiation and persuasion which may be involved in keeping administrative legislation up to accepted standards.

This observation suggests the principal duty of the reviewing agency stationed at the crossroads. It is to ensure so far as possible that legislation embody provisions which facilitate good administration—"good" in the sense of being competent and energetic, honest and impartial, economical and responsible. Whether the job can be done by reliance on persuasion alone, or whether it requires some form of committee control over the work of other committees cannot be foretold; experience will provide an answer, indeed probably more than one.

An alternative form of organization to improve administrative legislation would be the creation of three over-all committees (preferably joint committees), on budget, personnel, and planning. Some coordination among them could be brought about by making the chairman of each a member of the other two.

In any form of such central clearance there must be adequate guarantees against delay or sabotage. One such guarantee would be an easy method for the automatic clearance of bills after a specific number of days, except by agreement with the bill's sponsor.

The procedure by which reorganization of the federal administration was pushed forward in 1939 deserves consideration by the states. It combines complete legislative control with executive initiative in a field where congressional paralysis prevented improvement of the federal administrative system. The procedure includes preparation of a plan by the President and its submis-

sion to Congress. The plan lies on the table in each house for sixty days. If during that time it is not disapproved by a majority vote in both houses, it goes into effect at the end of the waiting period.²

State legislatures, like Congress, have guarded jealously the power to establish and reorganize administrative agencies. During the last quarter century, they have enacted many reorganization measures, and have contributed a great deal to the improvement of state administration. The initiative usually came from the executive branch, and the program was usually an administration measure, carefully tailored to fit. Here again the legislature frequently did too much, and enacted detailed administrative codes, freezing the administrative structure until remedial legislation could be later secured. A more flexible situation can be maintained by the arrangement adopted by Congress in 1939.

These suggestions in favor of the discovery and publication of standards of administrative legislation, and proposing a legislative agency to facilitate the regular observance of such standards are not put forward as a cure for all legislative ills. Their efficacy for the special purpose in view, indeed, depends upon more deeply seated remedies for the relative weakness of representative bodies. They fall outside the scope of this paper.³

These observations are not intended to cast doubt

2. See John D. Millett and Lindsay Rogers, "The Legislative Veto and the Reorganization Act of 1939," in *Public Administration Review*, I (Winter, 1941), 176-189.
3. See Massachusetts, Senate Document 50 (1943), Report of the Special Commission on Legislative System and Procedure; and a forthcoming report (1945) of the New York State Legislative Committee on Legislative Procedure, Methods, Practices, and Expenditures. Current developments are noted in *State Government*.

upon the necessity and desirability of legislative control of the administrative system. It is a part of our democratic tradition, with roots in the distant reaches of English constitutional history, that the representative assembly is the principal source of administrative authority, the exclusive source of funds, and the guardian against the dangers of bureaucracy. The forms of legislative control, however, demand reconsideration. At present they often fail to achieve their purpose, or have deteriorated into useless proceedings.

By way of example, the annual inspection of state institutions has become, in some states, nothing more than a pleasant junket. If it be the state university, the visiting representatives are taken on a tour of the campus, inspect the site of needed buildings, review a parade, eat an adequate luncheon, and attend a football game. Intensely partisan investigations are no more effective in securing intelligent consideration of administrative problems and needs. Control through patronage is politically effective, but certainly is not a solution from broader points of view.

The control of administration which theory and practice assign to representative bodies is designed to protect the general interests of the state by maintaining a competent and responsible public service. Here again the legislature will gain if it does not try to do too much—to control in detail. A legislative body is not well equipped to supervise administration in detail, even though it were continuously in session. It must concentrate where it can be effective. This means that it must so organize the administrative system that by giving attention to a limited number of key points it can reach the whole structure. In large measure the

legislature discharges its duty by creating strong agencies of self-control within the administrative system, which can quickly detect and remedy administrative faults or omissions.

The national government is moving slowly in this direction. The gradual evolution of the Bureau of Budget and its Division of Administrative Management suggests a much more intelligent and constructive type of administrative control than that so highly developed, not to say over-extended, by the Comptroller General of the United States.

In state governments this line of reasoning suggests that legislatures will be well advised to rely heavily upon the forms of control characteristic of an integrated administrative structure. One of their main responsibilities will then be to see to it that these administrative controls are properly put to use. Concentration of attention at this point could yield returns over a wide area which otherwise is likely to be overlooked. To ensure proper legislative supervision a standing committee is essential: preferably a standing Committee on Administrative Operations, with membership overlapping that of the proposed Committee on Administrative Legislation.

An Operations Audit

Legislatures may also become more effective organs of control by requiring the administrative agencies to maintain an operations audit. Many departments now carry on such an audit but it is unknown in others. An operations audit is designed to ascertain what results have been achieved. The traditional audit is designed to ascertain whether funds have been expended

legally. This object is of course important, but it gives the legislature no indication of what the people are getting for their money, or whether they are getting all that could properly be expected.

An operations audit is a refinement of the legislative tour of inspection. It ascertains what has been accomplished with appropriations—how many patients admitted to a hospital, how many miles of highway constructed, how many pupils taught at a given standard of education, how many inspectors of public water supplies. In so far as possible an operations audit also ascertains unit costs, and compares them with previous experience and with normal expectation. This kind of audit is thus distinct and separate from the fiscal audit.

Such an audit can best be conducted by the agency itself. The legislature, as a control, needs (1) to see that this audit is provided for generally, and with safeguards to ensure its reliability; (2) to take advantage of its results. One safeguard might be an independent check, from time to time, upon the methods of the operations audit; this could be arranged at little cost by retaining a firm of industrial engineers or outside public administration experts. The task of using the results is less easily arranged. One lead can be found in the work of the House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, which is continually responsible for a critical review of results achieved by the British government. It is a sort of permanent Truman Committee, with a chairman taken from the minority party.

It is by means such as these that the legislature can best discharge its important duties of over-all supervision as the people's representatives. Control in detail runs the risk of causing administrative paralysis. In

our times the legislature must be prepared to vest power in administrative officers; but it needs also to be eternally vigilant concerning the use of power.

The Defense of Administration

The share of legislative bodies in determining the form and conditioning the success of public administration is often overlooked and seldom given its due weight. In fact it is the dominant share. The legislature fixes the conditions under which administrative operations take place, and to which they must conform. I have argued in this paper that in detail legislatures often go too far, but in any event they cannot withdraw from a constitutional duty to provide a system of administration to meet public needs.

If a legislative body does well the minimum job it must do, it is entitled to credit for its handiwork. It would be a new but nevertheless a refreshing and appropriate argument for the reelection of a representative or senator that he had been influential in creating an effective instrument of administration to serve the people. Governors have been known to campaign on such an issue, although the legislature may have been equally responsible.

To reverse the position, it is also a clear duty of legislators to defend the public service which they have called into being against unfair and undeserved attacks. Even more it is their duty to refrain from such attacks. The point was admirably put in a recent address by Congressman Jennings Randolph of West Virginia:

The luxury of constantly blasting bureaucrats is one the government and the people can ill afford. Morale is determined in a large measure by the confidence which workers have in their leaders and the usefulness of their programs.

Federal employees have a right to react against carping criticisms in the press and on the radio.

The same comment is relevant to state and municipal employees. For the most part they are doing a good day's work to the best of their ability. Many of them are doing a superior job under unnecessary handicaps imposed by out-of-date or ill-considered laws. They are entitled to the respect of the community and of the law-makers, and to defense by legislative leaders.

A Legislative Opportunity

From the point of view of the future of the states in the American federal system, the general issue is charged with significance. Most students of American government agree that the relative position of the state vis-a-vis the national government is declining. Leadership tends to gravitate to Washington, and the steady expansion of federal grants to states tends to give Washington a powerful means of affecting the programs of the states. For my part I believe that the consequences have so far been praiseworthy; but the relative position of the state has been reduced. I hope to see the states remain as important centers of policy making and as independent centers of administration. They have an essential part to play even in a population and culture as homogeneous as ours. The tide has long been against them, however, and is likely to continue against them unless they raise their capacity to serve the people to uniformly higher level. I am aware of the high levels maintained by some states—in some cases perhaps superior to that of the federal government. Others have been less successful, and in nation-wide programs in which all states cooperate, the system has

to be constructed to meet the needs of the less progressive states.

In the years ahead we shall pass through a difficult era of reorganization and adjustment. The character of our problems will require a substantial degree of government activity—probably more than we have been accustomed to in the past. Large-scale management jobs will have to be done by state governments, sometimes in cooperation with the national government, often in cooperation with counties and cities. In the process of conversion to a peacetime economy there is a golden opportunity to lay better foundations for whatever administrative jobs states may undertake.

The opportunity can be brought to its highest fruition if legislators recognize that management needs freedom, can be trusted, and must be held accountable for results. The statute books can be usefully purged of a heavy accumulation of negative restrictions and limitations. A new formulation of legislative policy toward management can be deliberately undertaken. Better organization within the legislative assemblies can be devised to secure general observance of such a policy. The potential improvements in operation are very great. To attain them, the body of public employees, steadily strengthened by improved management, needs relief from ignorant and ill-willed criticism, but never needs exemption from responsible investigation and control by the direct representatives of the people.

II

Administrative Efficiency Within a Democratic Polity

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I

A man travelling through rough undergrowth is likely to concentrate upon his footing to such an extent that he tends to lose his sense of direction. Soon he is lost and may wander in circles for days. We, as a people, run that danger today. It is not surprising. Depression following war, a second World War immediately thereafter, more tangled problems now lying ahead than we have ever encountered before; small wonder, then, that we struggle to retain our past perspectives and our sense of future balance. The blood goes to our legs and away from our heads. In our anxiety to overcome a growing panicky feeling we say to ourselves, "If we can only keep going, we will get there somehow." The half-lost wanderer usually does. In the case of whole peoples, however, the outcome is not so rosy. They must keep going and at the same time keep their past and future perspectives clear or they may be lost for generations.

In the present crisis we hear people saying that popular government is the best government when you can afford it, but let's admit it's a luxury. When the going gets rough, they say, you have to emphasize efficiency—it takes organization and efficiency to win wars and depressions. We must concentrate power, accept the lead-

er principle temporarily, check some aspects of democratic assumptions for a while and pick them up again when it is safe to do so. This argument attracts followers, just as running seems the thing to do when you are lost. But where the argument breaks down is in the assumption that efficiency and democracy are mutually exclusive, that they cannot be combined. If we keep our perspectives intact, I think we shall see that each strengthens the other and that, separated, they both grow weak.

The greatest single force for good today is the determination of common humanity the world over to rise, to improve itself. The black night of the Middle Ages was over when men substituted belief in their own right impulses for an authority outside themselves. Our own American Revolution, based upon the conviction that opportunity will make the propertyless second and third sons the equal of the first-born under primogeniture, brought a two hundred year growth to a powerful climax. Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, Wilson, and Roosevelt have kept it growing and re-energized. More accurately, they have been raised up as leaders by the people. But the power and the passion is in the people. This may still be called the century of the common man. It will continue to be if we can keep our perspectives and if we can combine the end, which is democracy, with the means, which is the efficient processes gearing us to a technologically induced complexity in the kind of life we lead today.

Herodotus early envisioned what we Americans now mean by democracy. He defined it as the form of government in which the ruling power is not in any particular class or classes, but in the members of the community as

a whole.¹ In more recent time James Bryce, in his *Modern Democracies* has elaborated upon Herodotus, saying, "Where the will of the whole people prevails in all important matters, even if it has some retarding influences to overcome, or is legally required to act for some purposes in specially provided manner, that may be called Democracy."² He then went on to point out that democracy as a form of government was widely accepted (this was in 1920), but that in the future the important question would be "the purposes to which it may be turned, the social and economic changes it may be used to effect." The new functions that are being thrust upon it, he concluded, make it more than ever necessary that the machinery should be so constructed as to discharge these functions efficiently and in full accord with the popular wish.³

A further amplification of this idea is found in Carl Becker's University of Virginia lectures, published in 1941 under the title *Modern Democracy*, in which the author points out that democracy cannot survive unless business and government, working together, can solve our most serious economic problems.⁴ A weak democracy cannot be expected to maintain a strong economy any more than a sick business order will inspire confidence in popular rule. Business and government are interacting and interdependent.

Steam, gas, electricity, radio, and airplanes are the modern bases of society. They have revolutionized business and government. Unless we proceed more rapidly than we have to master the most difficult art and science

1. *Histories*, Book VI. Ch. 43.

2. *Modern Democracies* (New York, 1921), I, 22.

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 5, 6.

4. *Modern Democracy* (New Haven, 1941), pp. 31 ff. Cf. Charles E. Merriam, *What is Democracy?* (Chicago, 1941) and Ordway Tead, *The Case for Democracy* (New York, 1937).

of them all, government, man's unquenchable passion for dignity and self improvement may make him impatient of the slow gait of democracy. The successful blending of democracy and efficiency, therefore, becomes the most urgent and important problem of the morrow. Can such a blend be effected? Or does every increase in administrative efficiency withdraw just that much of democratic flavor and freedom?

The problem, as I see it, is how to inculcate a greater respect for representative government in the holders of administrative power, "the efficiency boys," and at the same time inject more administrative efficiency into popular assemblies, "the political boys." One of the hard-learned truths that we tend to forget, because of blurred perspectives, is that representation is the essence of the democratic process. The health of popular government is measured by the efficiency of the popular assembly—be it Congress, state legislature, or municipal council—and the degree of confidence the people have in it. Tested by this criterion, therefore, we have reason to be disturbed about our center of political gravity, the legislative assembly. One of the most able men in Congress confided to me, shortly before I left Washington, that he hated to admit in a corner drug store that he was a Congressman. His sensitivity was not atypical. Why this inferiority complex? Partly, I think, it is due to the uncomplimentary remarks found in the press and among one's constituents. Among some Congressmen, this one included, it is partly a reflection of dissatisfaction with Congress' institutional shortcomings, which, fortunately, a growing number are determined to correct. In no small part it is the natural reaction of an elected representative who sees the increasing power and prestige of the executive. Whatever the cause, this collective inferiority complex bodes

ill for democracy, if allowed to continue, and must, therefore, be got rid of.

We public administrators can contribute to a sounder outlook on the part of elected representatives if we will only consider our own unthinking attitudes and take the necessary steps to change them. Business executives and government officials alike suffer from a delusion which is due to insufficient perspective. One of the significant and disturbing things I learned in the course of a study of big business organization and management a few years ago is that our country's top executives apparently believe in a benevolent but unbridled rule.⁵ Our corporate boards of directors have become typically officer boards instead of the traditional representative boards composed primarily of owners and public representatives. These executives are apparently satisfied that first-hand knowledge of the company's affairs qualifies them for policy-making and decisions as it does not businessmen from related walks of life. Said one, "Officer boards are here to stay. If the public can't trust us, they can't trust anyone. But with few exceptions, they can trust us." How familiar this theory of benevolent rule sounds to the student of political history and institutions! If more business men possessed historical perspective, they would see the errors of so arrogant a complacency. Let them read the *Federalist*. Let them consult the founders of our political system, who learned the hard way that unbridled power is ultimately abused, that democratic checks are everywhere necessary, that policy-making and execution should be parcelled out among different sets of officials, that democratic control is the price we must pay for freedom and the private ownership of wealth. We

5. *Bureaucracy and Trusteeship in Large Corporations*, Temporary National Economic Committee (Washington, 1940), XI.

have not learned, apparently, that the essence of free enterprise is trusteeship, a trusteeship by public representatives and not by salaried officials.

Unless we are careful, we governmental executives run the danger of making the same mistake. The conditions are the same. The executive branch has a first-hand experience with laws, the legislature does not; the executive has the research staff which can provide him with the knowledge that is power, the legislature has a totally inadequate staff; administrative establishments have superior personnel and facilities for drafting legislation. The result is that administrators become impatient with the slow-moving legislature and secretly contemptuous of its poorer facilities. Legislators soon learn of this. Their retaliative instinct is to put the bureaucrat in his place and, as a rule, he deserves to be slapped down.

But, taking another view of the matter, what the legislator needs most is to restore the center of gravity to his own institution by acquiring the organization, the coordination and the personnel to do for himself what the administrator is otherwise forced to do because he has the facilities which the legislature lacks. That is why I say it is a two-way proposition: the administrator must change his attitude, the legislator improve his techniques.

II

In 1934, just ten years ago, W. F. Willoughby wrote his *Principles of Legislative Organization and Administration*. It is not a scintillating book such as Woodrow Wilson's *Congressional Government* or James Bryce's *Modern Democracies*, but it is a sound and scholarly work. In this comprehensive treatise, based upon years of first-hand observation in Washington, Willoughby applied the principles and techniques of public adminis-

tration to the organization and functioning of our national legislative assembly. A program for restoring to Congress its self-esteem and efficiency is contained in it.

Recently the movement for Congressional reform has received new momentum, due in no small part to the work of the Committee on Congress of the American Political Science Association, under the able chairmanship of George Galloway.⁶ Roland Young has supplied penetrating analyses and practical recommendations in his book, *This is Congress*, published in 1943. It begins to look as though administrative reform might really take place, for in the 78th Congress no less than fifty proposals were advanced by members of that body looking toward better staffing, simplification of the committee system, improving the liaison between Congress and the Executive Branch, and more effective criticism and control over the administrative establishments.

Applying the principles and precepts of public administration to Congress, these are some of the measures that seem indicated: First, any institution must define and constantly re-define its objectives. As applied to Congress, this means that it must define its functions more precisely. It must put first things first if it is to be effective—this is the law of success in all fields of endeavor. The two most important functions of the legislature are to make laws, which involves fact-finding and deliberation, and to exercise systematic surveillance over the work of the executive agencies. The legislature itself should not attempt to administer its own laws, for,

6. This committee, originally appointed in 1941, met frequently for three years with members of Congress and influential members of the press. See Galloway's article, "On Reforming Congress," in the June, 1944, issue of *Free World*. See also *The Reorganization of Congress*, a Report of the Committee on Congress of the American Political Science Association (Washington, 1945).

as John Stuart Mill so convincingly argued, it is not equipped for this task by either composition or aptitude. If the legislature is to be the center of governmental gravity, it must rigorously unburden itself of all delegable and less essential duties and concentrate upon those which are indispensable. The time-consuming settlement of private claims, the government of the District of Columbia, and private bill legislation should be transferred to special procedures or to self-governing agencies. Something analogous to the British "provisional order" procedure would take care of a substantial part of it.

After the jurisdiction of Congress has been re-defined, the next step is to organize in such a way that each major function will be taken care of by an appropriate and simple mechanism. Congress is splintered at present because of the multiplicity of its committees—eighty in all, not to mention the special investigating committees which at times number almost as many. The committee system should be consolidated with the following considerations in mind: first, major fields of public policy should be determined, such as defense, foreign relations, social services, agriculture, and business—possibly a dozen in all; then there should be a complete correspondence between the committees of the two houses, which cannot be said to exist at the present time; and finally, the committee structure should correspond as closely as possible with the major functional divisions of the executive departments and establishments.

The next major step is coordination, the integration of component parts into a smoothly operating and responsible mechanism. Congress at present is bewildered because its parts are so scattered. Each Senator, on the average, is supposed to serve on no less than six separate committees. "The House," said Woodrow Wilson in *Con-*

gressional Government, "has as many leaders as there are subjects of legislation; . . . Each committee goes its own way at its own pace."⁷ The best solution that has been thought of is to coordinate the committees, once their number has been reduced to a workable size, through a legislative cabinet.⁸ A joint steering body, composed of committee chairmen, would prepare and initiate legislation. This plan would give us one of the best features of the cabinet plan. Moreover, it would help to protect the country against the raids of special interests, for, as Woodrow Wilson pointed out, the multiplicity of existing committees opens the way to the power and manipulation of lobbyists.⁹ It is encouraging to note that since 1931 eight states have created "legislative councils" similar to what is here recommended.

Coordination would be further strengthened if both major political parties would return to decision by caucus on all major legislative issues. The political party introduces an element of responsibility into our presidential system which is badly needed; but when neither the majority nor the minority acts in concert on important matters but members of both parties feel free to jump party fences whenever the spirit moves them, we are left with a hopelessly confused situation bordering upon the anarchic. It is upon such situations that the lobbyists thrive.

Objectives defined and organization and coordination strengthened, we come next to the question of adequate staffing for the law-making function. Consider the situation as it exists today. During the first session of the

7. *Congressional Government* (Boston, 1913), pp. 60-61. Cf. "Congressman: A Case History—a Report on How Congress Works, and How It Might Be Made to Work Better," *Fortune*, (April, 1943) p. 76.

8. Roland Young, *This Is Congress* (New York, 1943), pp. 247-256.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 190.

78th Congress a total of 384 laws was enacted, of which 219 were public and 165 were private measures. The House passed 795 bills and resolutions, the Senate 702. During this same period, appropriation bills totalling 114 billions in direct appropriations were enacted into law. This enormous task was accomplished by legislators overburdened with as many as seven committee assignments, assisted by 278 clerks and messengers (average salary \$2,625), representing a total expenditure for clerk hire by the 80 committees and 531 Members of well under five million dollars. When Congress starves itself by underpaying a wholly inadequate administrative staff, is it any wonder that its fact-finding, law-making function suffers and that, increasingly, legislation originates in the executive branch, where personnel is adequate and salaries better? The point has been graphically driven home by Senator LaFollette:

One of the traditional powers of Congress over the executive is supposedly control over the purse strings. Obviously, that control cannot be exercised intelligently unless Congress has the facilities and the expert staff to appraise and evaluate appropriations just as the Budget Bureau does. Yet the annual appropriation for the staff of the Bureau of the Budget is 13 times as large as the appropriations for the staff of the Senate and House Committees on appropriations combined.¹⁰

The remedy is clear: get a sufficient, well-paid and well-qualified staff, and organize it around the important committees and the Legislative Reference Service. Knowledge is power. Lack of knowledge is dependency.

Finally, in our list of administrative topics as applied to Congress, we come to control, which is most simply defined as checking up on results and holding people

10. "A Senator Looks at Congress," *Atlantic Monthly* (July, 1943), pp. 91-96.

responsible. This is the second of the major functions of Congress, but its controls have never been adequately organized or regularized. Congressional investigation, one of the legislature's principal weapons, was aptly characterized by Woodrow Wilson as a fishing expedition, sweeping the dirty corners, locking the barn door after the horse is stolen. Congress must develop a technique whereby executive officers, from Cabinet members down, can be brought before it, asked for information, and allowed to give explanations whenever it sees fit. Nothing would do more to alleviate the current legislative-executive jealousy and re-build the self-esteem of Congress. And it would be good for the executives as well. If they revealed an inability to get along with the public, which Congressman Ramspeck says is an indispensable characteristic of an executive, they would soon have to develop it. Congressman Kefauver's resolution proposes a workable solution, a question period similar to that found in the British Parliament but without membership in the legislative body.

If even this minimum reform were adopted by Congress, it would go far toward tightening up the loose joints and making the process of legislation more efficient. But would it be as democratic? Yes, I am confident that it would, for democracy is not disjointedness and sprawling cumbersomeness. It is rationality and competence. How else can the difficult adjustments within our national economy and in the orderly relations among nations be brought to a sure and speedy solution? For every task there is an appropriate mechanism. If the mechanism fails, then the plan fails and we are pitched into a dangerous impasse.

III

The executive branch not only needs a deep and abiding respect for the people's elected representatives but it must further strengthen its own administrative efficiency. Weaknesses in the organization structure of the popular assembly are not as serious as weaknesses in the administrative mechanism, for the latter must carry the brunt of the operating load. An imperfect law can often be repaired by resourceful administration, but poor enforcement will render ineffectual the best of legislation.

Most of the faults which have been noted in the legislative branch are found also in the executive establishment. Despite marked improvements in recent years, a further sharpening of objectives and elimination of non-essentials is needed; inadequate coordination is the chief weakness of all; staffing has been improved but is still unsatisfactory in strategic areas; while adequate supervision and control could and should be widely strengthened. Though there is reason to be encouraged because of what has been accomplished in federal administration in recent years, we would be inexcusably complacent if we were to gloss over remaining deficiencies. Our national administration carries a heavier managerial load, because of its variety and complexity, than the country's largest corporations.¹¹

Just as Congress must dispose of minor and unessential duties before it will be free to concentrate upon the central needs, so also the administration must lighten its burden by turning back to state and local authorities any functions which can be managed with social effectiveness at that level. The number of such possibilities may not

11. Cf. Marshall E. Dimock, "Executive Responsibilities: the Span of Control in the Federal Government," *Advanced Management*, III, No. 1 (January, 1938), 22-23.

be great, but the resulting benefit would be surprisingly large from the standpoint of federal manageability. Even greater potentialities inhere in regionalization and decentralized federal administration. Executive Washington should make and control policy and delegate to field enforcement as much of its actual execution as possible. The principle applicable here is analogous to the rule which applies in the case of Congress. In the techniques of devolution, Washington can learn much from such corporate governments as the American Telephone and Telegraph Company and General Motors.

Congress is suspicious of organization theory; public administrators sometimes lack discrimination in applying it. Here again efficiency and democracy must be combined in the right proportion to get the best results. There is a seeming paradox when it comes to deciding what systematic administrative theory should do, but on closer observation it will be seen to be a highly practical blend. I mean just this: we must refine our principles of organization and administration and then make exceptions to them in application whenever the net result would be more sensible and effective. Business men call this combining the theoretical and the practical. I fear that we who have not had business experience sometimes err in this respect because of doctrinaire assumptions, insufficient practical experience, or an excess of zeal. Some of our federal reorganizing is justly criticizable on this score.

It is a principle of sound management that separate programs having the same general purpose and characteristic should be functionally combined. But this principle must always be weighed in the balance against three others: first, that accomplishment of the purpose of the legislation is the ultimate test of organization theory, not, as is sometimes assumed, the convenience of the

administrator; second, that when a program is successful, it should be left alone, because to transplant it may destroy much of the reason for its past success; and, finally, that the consolidation of too many separate programs into a single unit may tax the span of control of the top executive to such an extent and limit the former freedoms of the operating officials placed under him so seriously that all the programs in the combine are worse off than they were before. Beware of a passion for theoretical organizational consistency that is not balanced by these pragmatic considerations.

Now if it is true, as I suppose, and as Carl Becker and James Bryce have testified, that an essential function of democracy is to assure the carrying out of popularly supported programs, and if administration is merely the means and public policy the end, then our organization theories must always be consistent with and, in case of doubt, subordinate to the larger social principles. Much additional reorganization will be necessary in Washington after the war and it therefore becomes important that we think deeply about these matters.

During World War II, as in the previous World War, the tendency was to create new agencies rather than to expand old ones or to tie emergency units in with existing departmental structures. In some cases, as with the War Production Board and the Office of Price Administration, there seems little doubt that any but the course actually followed would have been out of the question. They were so large, so rapidly expanding, so dependent upon split-second decisions and quick action, that independence of old-line departmental structure was essential. We shall never know how the results would have compared if some of the other wartime programs in which departmental affiliation seemed more plausible had been

tied in to existing framework instead of separately established. To the credit of the older departments and establishments let it be said that most of them converted to a war-time footing with commendable alacrity. They had the advantage of smoothly operating internal organization which the emergency programs quite naturally took months to acquire. They suffered, in comparison, in that they were more set and somewhat rigid in their ways. I served for over two years in an institution which had the advantages of both. The Maritime Commission and the War Shipping Administration were the old and the new. They were separate and yet they were allied under the same head. Until such time as the War Shipping Administration got on its feet, its older brother, the Maritime Commission, supplied its central staff services. The formula worked successfully and might be followed more widely another time.

Examples could be given of both old and new agencies which excelled under wartime conditions. It does not seem valid, therefore, to say that one or the other should be employed exclusively. What did seem to hurt many programs was the necessity of reshuffling and regrouping just as they were about to settle down. Much of this must be chalked up to the exigencies of the war and to the trial and error methods of a democracy, so that it can never be entirely eliminated. But I do wish that we administrative people could acquire a deeper appreciation of how serious a matter it is to dig up a flourishing tree and transplant it into someone else's back yard. It takes time to reestablish the root structure and during that time the tree withers.

As a profession, one of our collective conceits that we should learn to laugh at is our uncritical assumption that governmental administration is a mystery which exec-

utives from other fields, such as business, cannot be expected to succeed at without long indoctrination. When we get into this haughty frame of mind, we should remind ourselves that business men used to say with equally straight faces that business management has its unfathomable mysteries which bar its select circle from ordinary supervisors and workers.

If government is really a mystery, then it should be a challenge to us to improve it by making it more rational and more practical. Personally, I have come to have a profound belief in the transferability of administrative skill. During the war we have seen men go into the government from industry, finance, labor unions, the professions—every field where institutional management is the common factor—who have registered outstanding records. Our principal war production agencies were headed by business men whose names will deservedly live in history. True, most of them experienced preliminary difficulties of adjustment, but who does not in a new institutional setting? When they return to their former employments, it will be with the feeling that there are respects in which federal administration deserves hearty commendation, others in which they see what is faulty and what needs to be done. Red tape, inadequate coordination, too many interferences with operating officials, and excessive emphasis upon central control techniques, are aspects of democratic administration which in some cases have a rational and necessary justification, but which in most cases can be minimized and improved if there is a sufficiently strong desire for successful performance. This, as I see it, is a challenge to the political science fraternity which the presence of men from non-governmental walks of life in wartime Washington has brought sharply to our attention. We would be more widely respected if we

could eliminate the mystery upon which we sometimes rely. This is not to minimize the importance of W. N. Kiplinger's observation in *Washington Is Like That* when he avers that government requires a broader, more statesmanlike view than businessmen have customarily acquired, as well as a single-minded devotion to the larger interest which previous association with a particular interest tends to compromise.

Inadequate coordination is the greatest administrative defect of American national government. Prominent war-time officials returning from trips to Great Britain, Russia, and other of the United Nations during World War II, consistently applauded the qualifications and administrative competence of our administrators, in comparison with other systems, but emphasized that in one important respect we were glaringly inferior, in top coordination and integration all along the line. When jurisdictional disputes arose in Great Britain or Russia, for example, as they were bound to, the matter was immediately brought to a head and definitely settled; in this respect we were far less successful. The difference is basically attributable to organizational structure, although traditions in Great Britain and party discipline in Russia also play important parts.

Our chief organizational weakness is that the President, in the nature of things, cannot provide the coordinating attention which the world's largest governmental structure requires. His time is pre-empted with too many other essential duties—commander-in-chief, leader in foreign affairs, chief legislator, party leader, ceremonial head. What is required is an official comparable to the operating vice-president of a large corporation. That we cannot get along without him is convincingly shown by the steps taken to vest large coordinating authority in the

Director of War Mobilization during World War II, an official who was popularly referred to as the Assistant President.

Might it not be a good idea to amend the Constitution,¹² so that the Vice-President would no longer be required to preside over the Senate, thus releasing him for the role of operating vice-president? The need for this kind of executive in our federal government weighs far more heavily than the Vice-President's present function. The Senate could easily elect its own presiding officer—in fact, it does, during the Vice-President's absence.

It may be objected that this change would weaken the liaison between the legislative and executive branches. This is an important consideration if there is this danger. But it need not be so because substitute measures could provide an even better liaison than that which the Vice-President now affords in his position in the Senate. There is, for example, the proposal to adopt the question time practice, and the joint planning of legislation, referred to later. Why should the President have his running partner in the Senate and no corresponding emissary in the House? The Vice-President should become what his title suggests, the operating vice-president who would coordinate the administrative branch under policies and directives decided upon after consultation with the President.

Under this proposed system, real executive coordina-

12. Art. I, sec. 3, of the Constitution provides, "The Vice-President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no vote, unless they are equally divided." Ogg & Ray, in *Introduction to American Government* (1942) state (pp. 291-292), "Unless a person of unusual force, which he rarely has been, and also of high standing in the councils of his party, the figure ensconced in the Senate Chair seldom seeks to exercise any sort of leadership or to influence the course of legislation."

tion should be feasible. Without a responsible number two man, and with the President attempting to carry the whole administrative load, any attempt to patch up the present arrangement seems foredoomed to failure. It is no solution to give the President six executive assistants with a "passion for anonymity." If they perform a valuable service for their chief, they will take time which he should be devoting to relations with his Cabinet officials; if they are not essential to his coordinating effort, then they should never have been created, because staff assistance of this character and variety has no place in the top executive's outer office. This is consonant with the principle that the chief executive should reserve his time for his Cabinet, to whom his door should be open at all times, and secure his fact-finding and analytical staff assistance by making it once removed, as in the case of the Bureau of the Budget or the former National Resources Board. The top executive should confine his office staff to secretaries and one or two confidential personal assistants. This is the system large corporations use. I feel sure that it is sound. Deviations can be justified on the ground of expediency alone; and on that basis the present system of six assistants was probably worth trying.

"Keep the lines clear to your department heads"—this is an admonition that needs constant repetition. With an operating Vice-President provided for, the second great coordinating agency of the government should be the Cabinet. It should have an executive secretary and an agenda which would emphasize administrative coordination. The President would preside and the Vice-President would sit at his right hand, not at the foot of the table. Few people realize that Calvin Coolidge, John N. Garner, and Henry A. Wallace are the only Vice-Presidents in American history who ever attended the

President's Cabinet meetings with any regularity.¹³ The signs point in the right direction, but we must go forward faster.

Still further coordination could be secured by the President's designating key members of his administration to meet with the proposed Legislative Council, dealt with above. All administration-sponsored measures would be considered by this group. The advantages of such a plan would lie in the close working relationships established between the legislative and executive branches, in the wider knowledge which the enforcement agencies would make regularly and systematically available to Congress, and in a further advance toward real party responsibility. As in the case of the proposed question time, it would provide the best features of cabinet government, as found in Great Britain, while retaining the superior features of our own presidential system.

War-time experience demonstrates the importance of adequate staff advisory and facilitative agencies, but at the same time shows the necessity of guarding against their improper use or misplacing them in the organization structure. It may be accepted as a general proposition that the larger an organization becomes, the more necessary it is to develop the staff function. Operating line officials are so busy that they need assistance in research, analysis of reports for control purposes, organization and procedural methods, personnel, budgeting, and public relations. But it is one thing to recognize the importance of the function and quite another to set up self-contained units which come to exercise independent authority and act unwittingly as bottlenecks. The formalization of staff units and the consolidation of power in them is basically

13. C. O. Paullin, "The Vice-President and the Cabinet," *American Historical Review*, XXIX (April, 1924), 496-500.

unwise. The so-called administrative management function should meet the following tests: Is the staff work correctly distributed at all levels of coordination, rather than concentrated in a single formal organization at the top? Is every staff function tied in with the work of a responsible line official, whose servant it is? Is the top executive free from the encumbrance of a demanding staff unit placed directly within his own office? Have staff assistants been given misguided authoritative functions so that they consider themselves as watch-dogs for the Civil Service Commission, the Bureau of the Budget, or some other agency? Management cannot be unified and efficient unless all responsibility is vested in the responsible line officials and unless the flow of authority is direct and unbroken from one level of coordination to the next.

One meets inexperienced experts in Washington who seem to think that if you have enough employees, sufficient funds, and a few competent staff experts, a program is sure to be self-operating and assured of success. They overlook the most important element, that is, the operating executives at each level of coordination who give the work its drive, its timing, and its integration. Too much staff activity or wrongly placed staff work is a positive handicap to the executive. If staff assistants could be given a course of training in line work first, the results would be vastly better. In self-defense we must see that our proteges are so schooled. Otherwise, we may expect to hear more widely a complaint which is already prevalent: "Beware the administrative expert."

Next only to coordination, administrative Washington's crying need is for executive personnel. It matters not where they come from so long as they have matured to the point where they possess transferability of adminis-

strative skill. You cannot streamline an organization nor secure efficient coordination without executive talent. That is why the so-called invasion of Washington by men from non-governmental walks of life during World War II has had such a healthy effect upon the federal service.

IV

In training men and women for government service we should hold out to them the challenge of serving at different times in both the legislative and executive branches. Washington needs more executives who possess the qualifications of the statesman—individuals capable of contributing equally as formulators of policy in the legislature or as administrators and coordinators of policy at the bureau or sub-Cabinet level. This is our greatest skill shortage today and it will probably continue to be.¹⁴ Not until we recognize the necessity of training more broadly for the government service and stimulating in promising students a desire for both legislative and executive experience will we be able to supplement the supply of naturally gifted men and women who succeed in climbing the administrative career ladder. More transferability back and forth between legislature and administration will serve the ends of both democracy and efficiency—of democracy because it will help to bridge the gulf between the Civil Service and our elective representatives; of efficiency because it will supply elements of leadership which are sorely needed.

Democracy and efficiency can be made to work in harmony without weakening either. It is not an easy blend to make and there are many chances of failure. But if we allow our democratic mechanisms to fall into a state of

14. This thought has been developed in the author's article, "Bureaucracy Self-Examined," *Public Administration Review*, IV No. 3 (1944), 205.

disrepair, then people are likely to become impatient and apt to welcome a minority rule which they hope will improve the situation. Sincere believers in democracy may well come to confuse laxity and loose organization with a democratic environment. On the other hand, efficiency for efficiency's sake is a dangerous doctrine and may unwittingly lead a country toward minority rule and an unbearable regimentation.

The philosophical insights required for a successful blend are these: avoid extremes in either case; take the best in each and combine them; analyze how government may correct economic disequilibriums induced by revolutionary technological change and destructive wars, then see to it that the governmental mechanism is adequate to the task; strengthen the legislature by strengthening its functions and improving its efficiency; fortify the administrative machine by keeping it responsible and democratic, in spirit as well as in relationship. Some time, perhaps, we may approach the ideal envisaged by James Bryce, when ". . . the average citizen will give close and constant attention to public affairs, . . . With such citizens as electors, the legislature will be composed of upright and capable men, single-minded in their wish to serve the nation. . . . Office will be sought only because it gives opportunities for useful public service. Power will be shared by all, and a career open to all alike."¹⁵

15. *Modern Democracies*, I, 48.

III

Notes on the Governmental Executive: His Role and His Methods

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Governmental executives—what they do and don't do and what they should and shouldn't do—have received their full measure of popular attention in recent years. They have been pulled apart and discussed pro and con. They have been demolished vocally; sometimes they have been given the stamp of approval. More often than not, however, these oral onslaughts have failed to take cognizance of the essential character of the executive job in large establishments. In the public press, and even in the textbooks, such phrases as "delegation of authority," "sharply defined responsibilities," "elimination of duplication and overlapping" are worked over repeatedly to the point of weariness. In the public administration societies it is the old stand-bys of organizing, coordinating, analyzing, budgeting, controlling, *ad infinitum*, that get the spotlight.

Discussion focused in these directions often misses the crux of the problem the executive must solve if he is to be able to guide and direct his organization so that it can carry out the program for which he is made responsible. What does the executive have to do if his leadership is to be effective? How does he meet the limitations and obstacles that are inherent in most management situ-

ations? It is with this point, the position of the executive and how it is implemented, that I am here concerned. It is not the planning, development, and execution of program that I propose to discuss, but rather the conduct of a large organization in discharging its assignment.

There is, of course, no standard prescription, no patent medicine that can be given to the executive, guaranteed to solve all his problems and leave him free of frustration and dismay. The differences in individuals who find themselves in executive positions and the variations in the life cycles of organizations produce practically limitless permutations and combinations. The pattern is never the same, and only after penetrating inquiry of the circumstances in each case would a wise man undertake to suggest what might be required to assist the executive in establishing reciprocal relationships with his organization.

A new organization set up to perform an emergency function—a War Production Board, an Office of Price Administration—puts very different demands upon its executives than an organization that has had time in which to mature its program and develop its precedents and traditions—for example, the New York State Department of Education, the U. S. Forest Service, or the Cincinnati Public Works Department. Similar contrasts run through the entire catalogue of agency characteristics. Requirements differ in an organization rendering a routinized service or engaged in a paper processing job, such as the Postal Service or a dependency benefits office, from requirements in a planning or development commission. They differ within the life of an organization, between the time when it is moving in an accustomed pattern and the time when external pressures or events are forcing drastic changes—the Department of Agri-

culture in the early years of the century and in the 1930's. They differ between an organization in which activities are conditioned to a large extent by outside circumstances and one in which the product to be developed is relatively definitive and tangible—the U. S. State Department vs. the Railroad Retirement Board.

When the variations in the personalities of executives are intermingled with the kaleidoscopic aspects of organization, the possible results become almost infinite. On the one hand, there are those who function by giving their staffs full rein and, on the other, those who believe in relying more on executive drive and push; the idea men and those whose expertness lies more in salesmanship and negotiation; the men skillful in legislative and public relationships and those whose forte is internal management; those with a great fund of administrative experience and those without. Both institutional and personality factors affect the sum total of what any organization is and both must be taken into account in estimating what is needed to make the thing work.

We have had sufficient experience in analyzing the variables, however, to have acquired some useful benchmarks. We have learned enough to know in a general way what is required if the executive is to be able to fulfill his role and what may stand in the way of success. It is in this context that I have assembled these notes in the hope that they might illuminate in some degree a few of the many facets of the problem of large scale public management.

By large scale, I mean organizations of such size as to preclude face to face dealing by the executive with all of the constituent elements. Although there will be many modifications in the method of executive leadership between an organization of 500 or 1,000 employees and one

of 10,000 or 20,000 employees, the variations are not crucial for the problem with which I am concerned: How results can be achieved when the activity is of such scope that it is beyond the ability of the executive to keep personally in touch with all of its aspects or to apply his personal efforts to very many of its problems.

Much of what I have to say is true of any large organization, public or private. In this discussion, however, I am directing my attention more specifically to the executive in the environment of the public service. By this I do not mean the Chief Executive: Mayors, Governors, the President, although many of my comments apply also to these top officials. What I am concerned with primarily is the number one man in an agency or department, or bureau or other major subdivision which presents the problem of leadership through an institutional framework.

The specialized conditions surrounding governmental programs put extraordinary demands on their directors in terms of knowing how to weave the competing and disparate elements into a unified whole and producing an organization capable of accomplishing its mission. Public pressures, the need to adjust to the views of legislative bodies, the rigidities in procedures attendant upon management according to law and executive regulation are elements present in any public service enterprise. All of these are related to that central characteristic that distinguishes executive positions in the public service from those in private management—the fact that the government executive is the guardian of the public interest and is accountable to the electorate, directly or indirectly, for what he does. This is very different from the concern for the public which the private executive has in relation to

the marketability of his product and the good name of his firm.

In addition, many present day governmental organizations directed toward mobilization of the nation's resources for war and preparation of the United States for support of international commitments have inherent complexities in program that are unique. The problems we have faced and are still facing in finding and developing sufficient executive leadership for these unprecedented enterprises are indicative of the need of further probing and understanding of what it takes to bring public service and the demands that are now placed upon it into balance.

The Executive's Role

This discussion of the job of being a successful governmental executive is predicated on the assumption that the product of any organization is an institutional product, not the executive's personal product. What the executive can accomplish—his impact on the organization—at any one point in time is conditioned by the state of his organization, and what he achieves is largely the product of his influence rather than his command. Therefore, in long range terms, the job of an executive is to create an environment conducive to concerted effort in pursuit of the organization's objectives. In short run terms, his job is to know what is going on in the organization and to be in a position to act on the issues which require his personal attention and still to retain sufficient freedom to deal with those outside his organization—superiors, legislators, public. Stated differently, the executive's job is one of maximizing his influence throughout his organization as distinguished from relying exclusively upon his formal authority and the power of command. A good

many aspects of these propositions have been probed by others, notably by Mr. Chester Barnard in his numerous writings on executives and their work, and perhaps require no further comment. In many quarters, however, these concepts seem to be insufficiently understood.

Whatever may be the notions of what executives do and how they do it, the bedrock fact is that the executive must rely on his staff for the achievement of his objectives. Most issues in his organization will be settled without ever reaching him. And on those that do reach him his choice will generally be a restricted one. By the time a report or instruction has been developed, worked over, revised, reviewed, level by level, what finally remains for the executive to say in most cases is "OK." He may be inclined to make some changes, but he will soon learn that something else will demand his attention before he is through. Unless what comes to him involves an issue of great importance, he will, therefore, frequently have to accept what he considers to be an inferior product. When the issue is a crucial one for the organization's program and involves high level judgments on the consequences of a given course of action, the executive may be called upon to choose among two or three alternative solutions, but secondary questions are likely to have to go by the board. Consequently, unless the executive's objectives are wholeheartedly accepted by his organization, the chances that they will be achieved are problematical.

Failure on the part of the executive to seek aggressively his organization's support may leave him in a precarious position. The forces militating against an effective working together toward a common goal are many and powerful in any large organization: unreconciled points of view, tradition and routine, inertia, the distortions that grow out of specialist interests, personal ambitions. These

internal resistances singly or in combination can cancel out the executive's efforts. To be sure, some of the drives in any established organization represent forces of stability that will keep the organization running when there is no leadership and will save the new executive from many mistakes. Furthermore, the necessary adjustment of the executive to the facts of his environment can contribute to his development by increasing his understanding of how he can function in relation to what goes on around him. On the other hand, if the executive is entirely unsophisticated in the ways of institutional behavior and does not consciously and continuously take steps to offset the divisive elements in his environment, he will find himself dominated by rather than dominating his organization.

The executive is often seen as the man sitting at the top of the organization possessed of a dangerous amount of authority, hiring and firing at will, whose every suggestion or order is responded to promptly and completely. This view reflects one of the greater misconceptions about the nature of executive work. The government executive may have a large grant of legal authority, but he will find that in actual fact it must be used in an economical fashion. If he lacks discrimination in the use of his power, he will debase its value and perhaps find himself impotent at a moment of crucial importance. He must guard against destroying the organizational support on which he must depend in executing his program. As Paul Appleby has often remarked, the new executive in an organization may fire a few persons but not very many. Reducing the point to an absurdity, he can't issue an order, "Now and henceforth all employees shall wear red neckties," and expect to get a response. By persuasion, by indoctrination, by leadership—in other words by influence—he

may, however, be able to accomplish what he cannot accomplish by fiat. This is by no means a universally understood truth. There are too many executives who fail to recognize that because the members of their organizations are creatures of reason, their positions would be strengthened if they bolstered their formal authority with the support that comes from conviction.

I do not mean to suggest, however, that awareness of the importance of influence as a method of reaching institutional goals is a strictly milk and honey proposition of dubious effectiveness in moments of crisis. If the executive is skillful and knows how to establish his position, he can be the decisive element in determining the character of the organization, and he can exercise his authority with telling effect when the occasion demands it. The point is he cannot "bull his way through" any and all situations; he cannot run against the tide of organization opinion. He may buffet his way by sheer force on occasion or on specific issues, but if he does it too often he may pay for his gains by failure to carry his organization with him over the long run.

I have already commented that the executive's job has to be viewed in long range terms as well as on a day-to-day basis. His aim will be to use his own time and talents on the activities and issues that will contribute the most to the organization's forward movement and to develop a supporting team to the point of optimum production. His success in reaching it will be, in important measure, determined by his success in developing a body of commonly shared ideas. This is a prerequisite if his staff are to have guide posts against which to judge their general direction and their specific actions and if he is to have some assurance of reliable performance. Without this kind of institutional environment, the executive will be

unable to mold the organization into something more than the sum of its parts. Furthermore, cultivation of such an atmosphere is essential if the members of the organization are to have a sense of participation in an enterprise bigger than themselves and secure the satisfactions necessary to good staff work. Only then do the fragmented jobs that are the lot of most people in large organizations become a source of stimulation.

The importance of an institutional environment and of indoctrination in its meaning has long been understood by the Army and Navy, but in large part has been neglected by civilian governmental organizations. It has often been observed that indoctrination permits West Point and Annapolis trained men to function, and function well, even though the commonly accepted rudiments of good organization may be missing in a given situation. Some of the civilian organizations such as the Farm Credit Administration, the New York City Police Force, and the Tennessee Valley Authority are conspicuous for their high morale—the natural by-products of a consciously fostered environment. More often than not, however, this basic source of organization strength has been given too little attention by governmental executives in this country.

Awareness of the problem does not mean prompt solution. Almost any executive is likely to find that the contribution he can make to an organization's environment can be made only over an extended period of time. Rapid adjustments, such as customarily take place in the Army and Navy at the outbreak of war, or in a relief agency in time of distress, are the exception rather than the rule. The recently appointed chief of a Federal bureau with many years of tradition and precedent behind it has estimated that his job of redirection is at least a ten-year

one. On occasions in the Federal Government when time considerations were crucial and other factors permitted, this problem has been solved by setting up a new agency, thus short circuiting the process of retooling a staff steeped in earlier programs and methods. This is a principal reason why some of the new war agencies were set up to do jobs which on the face of it might have been assigned to existing agencies. Normally, however, a government executive is likely to find it necessary to work with what he inherits and to develop a plan of action that can be followed without too much disruptive pulling and hauling. This may mean focusing his developmental efforts on future rather than on current activities, so that the daily work of the organization can move ahead with a minimum of uncertainty and interruption.

What the executive accomplishes over the short run will depend upon the state of the institutional environment at any one time and upon the external circumstances affecting his program. His day-to-day activities and decisions may be directly in line with his long range plans or he may be forced on occasions to accept situations or proposals that do not measure four square with his ultimate objectives. Whether the executive's job is viewed in long range or short range terms, however, the ways in which he can seek to maximize his influence and close the gap between present reality and the ultimate ideal of smoothly integrated activity are the same. It is on these that I shall comment briefly for the remainder of this discussion.

How He Spends His Time

The executive's concept of what his job is and the way this affects the scheduling of his time and talents will be a primary factor in the results he secures. In large part

this can be encompassed under the head of "operating at his proper level." In his recent book, *Big Democracy*, Paul Appleby develops the point at some length. By this he means that no head of a government department or other subdivision should do work or make decisions that should be the responsibility of officials at a lower level in the organizational hierarchy. Not only does this disrupt and confuse his subordinates but it prevents the executive from doing what is properly his job.

DEALING WITH PEOPLE. The executive job is one of dealing with people, of judging, adjusting to, and working around personalities both inside and outside his organization. This is at the core of the business of getting people to apply their energies in harmony with each other and getting things done. I recall a case of a city manager who was extremely unpromising at the time of his appointment. He had no apparent experience or interest in such matters as working out arrangements for delegations of authority or subdivision of labor, he probably had never heard of the follow-up principle, and he was completely baffled by theoretical discussions of management. He had, however, an abiding interest in people. He attracted people, and he had an uncanny sense of whom he could trust. Anyone looking at his organization and how he functioned would say it couldn't work. But it did. He had a feeling for what it took to provide the cohesion and the central pull necessary for turning out services to the community.

This is in part a reflection of the fact that the executive should use a major portion of his time and talents in being the catalyst who assimilates and draws together the ideas of others, resolves lines of action, gets agreements nailed down, sees that action gets taken. He must develop and rely on his staff for the carry through on the specific

elements of his program, and must carefully restrain himself if tempted to dip into technical work. If he does not, he will never have time for his part of the institutional job—the never-ending one of bringing about a consensus on the one hand and on the other of seeing that discussion does not protract interminably, that something decisive happens.

In doing this, he will need to take care not to go off on his own without regard for his organizational resources. If he forgets or ignores his staff in the course of operations, he runs the risk of dispensing off-the-cuff opinions which will not stand close analysis or making commitments which his organization cannot fulfill, not to mention the fact that such actions leave the staff in thin air. Unfortunately, not all governmental executives are like the one who commented to me recently that he doubted that he crossed up his staff as often as they did him. There are too many who operate as if the chief function of staff was to keep the executive from the embarrassment of explaining away their errors. This can only lead to a frittering away of strength in checking up on many small and relatively unimportant episodes.

The public arena character of the executive's responsibilities will draw upon his resources day and night, and he will find that in varying degrees, depending upon his status in the governmental scheme of things, he will not be able to live his life according to his personal choice but must govern himself in the light of the demands upon him. Nor will he be able to compensate for this by pointing at the end of the day to specific accomplishments and saying, "I did such and such." He may be able to think of a number of things that his organization did and how he tried to influence his organization and perhaps provide

the capstone to some enterprise, but he can't look upon the results as his own.

It is because of these characteristics of executive life and routine that the appointment of good technicians to administrative posts is often a failure. Unless the specialist happens to possess the rare quality of administrative aptitude he cannot be remade into an executive with satisfaction to either himself or his staff. Anyone who has observed governmental operations has seen many instances of the unfortunate consequences of moving to administrative posts persons who are first and last technicians—making a physician a public health officer, a design engineer a commissioner of public works, a social case worker a welfare director, a program idea man in a Federal department an assistant secretary.

NOT AS A TECHNICIAN. The need for the executive to eschew the technical and stick to the level where adjustments get made and judgments about the implications of surrounding circumstances are applied is one of the oft repeated dictums of the public administration fraternity, but the point too frequently is oversimplified. For one thing the dividing line can never be determined with finality. The extent to which the executive concerns himself with specific issues will always be affected by such factors as the age of his organization, outside circumstances, and the extent to which he may have to compensate for failures at lower levels.

In any event, the executive must know enough of the general field not to get lost in the labyrinth. If he does not know the program at the outset, he must master quickly its major substantive elements. Otherwise he will be unable to command the loyalty and respect of his specialists and weld them together as a team. He must have sufficient understanding of the basic issues involved in

his program to be able to judge whether the necessary steps have been taken to arrive at a proper conclusion. In the early days of the Federal Bureau of Old Age and Survivors Insurance, for example, the way in which individual participants were to be enumerated and their accounts identified—now numbering approximately seventy million—was one of the major technical issues. With many contending proposals advanced, members of the Social Security Board as well as the head of the Bureau had to go into the problem sufficiently to be assured that the staff had developed the best answer.

The more background the executive develops with the passage of time, the more discriminating will be his judgments that have technical ingredients. He will learn to know when he should overrule his specialists (seldom on technical grounds) and how far he can rely on them, and he will know enough not to be cowed by them. Although the executive must be able to find his way among the technicians, his dominating concerns are more likely to be the non-technical factors affecting the resolution of a problem, particularly the general implications and potential outside acceptance of what is done. While the state highway commissioner, for example, will need to keep up with major changes in specifications or design which may become centers of controversy, he will find that his main headaches will arise out of such questions as the right of way for a road or the location of a bridge.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. This necessary concentration of the executive on what is feasible and on judging what is in the public interest should affect materially the amount of time the executive spends in becoming sensitive to and influencing the outside environment. It is the executive's job to cultivate relationships with the heads of other government agencies, with members of legislative bodies,

with private institutions, and with the public, so that his staff will have a favorable climate within which to function. In this way he can increase his awareness of the ways in which programs and ideas must be carried out if they are to be accepted. The job of running interference for his organization is one that only the executive can do, and the effectiveness with which it is done will be a significant determinant of what his organization can accomplish.

His success in this part of his job will be affected in part by whether the executive confines his contacts to those that come to him or whether he consciously seeks to direct the character of these relationships. The government executive too often restricts himself to persons of his own social background or of the particular group with which his agency deals. He needs to mix with those who are against as well as for his program. If his agency's function is concerned with aids to business, he needs to understand the viewpoint of labor; if it is social welfare, he needs to mingle enough with the rugged individualists to see life from their angle. If his outside contacts are not well rounded or if he neglects them altogether, he may find that he will end up with a distorted view of the outside environment.

The executive's success in meeting these outside responsibilities will also be in part a by-product of his reaction to what his job demands of him as an individual. The broader and more generalized it is, the more important it will be for him to know what is going on not only in his general field, but in the community, in the nation, and in the world. He will need to broaden his own horizons, stretch his mind, and develop new ideas from which his whole organization can benefit. I know one Federal department head, for example, who met at regular

intervals with people of ideas both inside and outside his organization, thus doing comprehensively what every executive should do at least in some degree. As a basic minimum, he should find time to keep up-to-date on the journals and books that give perspective to government enterprise, and I do not mean here administrative literature, important as that may be. If he lets himself become so preoccupied with his immediate problems that he fails to keep up with life that is going on about him, he lets slip one of the best ways through which he can have an impact on his organization—by helping to bridge the gap between it and the world at large.

How He Saves His Time

I trust these comments on the level of activity on which the executive's energies should be focused do not give the impression that all the executive need do is have a bit of insight into what is demanded of him and proceed forthwith. It will unfortunately be an inevitable part of his lot that people and things will press for his attention far beyond his capacity to deal with them. His life will be a succession of meetings, telephone calls, documents. He cannot escape spending appreciable time handling many problems which will seem small in themselves but which may have serious implications for the status of the organization: persons who are not performing, staff troubles and worries, some aggrieved citizen, a press release. Many persons outside his organization will seek him out—citizens, legislators, newspaper men, old friends, *ad infinitum*.

Although he will need to take the greatest care not to appear inaccessible either to his staff or to those outside his organization, he must face the very practical problem of deciding whom he will see and of maintaining a bal-

ance among the competing demands for attention. If he holds himself open to deal with any problem that comes to him, he will become inaccessible to his operating chiefs and he will neglect his outside responsibilities. Decisions will be delayed. He will lose perspective on both his organization and the world and will fail to provide the upward pull and unifying influence that his position requires. With a little firmness and careful planning, however, there are a number of steps he can take to conserve his time, and he can establish controls that will in reality increase rather than decrease his accessibility.

PERSONAL STAFF. Judicious use of personal assistants is one of the best of these. In a large department or office, the executive may have several such assistants. Former Secretary of State Stettinius, in announcing new appointments in the State Department, designated fifteen persons to various types of assistant positions, in addition to the regular staff officers of the Department. For some of these, special areas of concern were indicated, e.g., International Organization and Security Affairs, Press Relations, Broad Management Matters; for others no special assignment was mentioned. This is probably far too many for the ordinary situation. The city manager of a city of 50,000 inhabitants, the head of a department of a medium-sized state, or a Federal division chief, for example, may find that a single administrative assistant will be sufficient.

One of the most important uses of the executive's personal staff, including his secretary, is in meeting the problem of seeing people. They can help him arrange his calendar, determine whom he should see, control the length of time he spends with visitors. They can frequently do much to satisfy those whom the executive is not able to see or arrange for their business to be disposed of by

other officials. To meet the needs of subordinates they can often secure spot information or decisions from the executive. They can arrange meetings between the executive and persons both within and without the organization according to relative urgency.

The personal staff can also help identify the most pressing problems requiring the executive's attention and can pave the way for their speedy disposition by being sure that all necessary information is at hand and in order. They can sometimes pinch hit for the executive on spot jobs. They can give assistance in writing speeches and articles and can accompany him on trips when they can be useful. They can keep him up-to-date with what is going on. Sometimes one of them serves as an intimate adviser and will help select key officials and evaluate the performance of subordinates who seem to be falling down on their jobs. Obviously, each of the executive's personal assistants is not assigned to all of these tasks, as there will be specialization among them. But until his immediate office is staffed with aides who can do some or all of these things for him, he will be unnecessarily handicapped.

On the other hand, he must guard against overdoing it. A large number of personal assistants may mean that there are deadheads or blanks in the organization for whom the executive is seeking to compensate by increasing his personal staff. This can only muddy up the regular lines of communication and command and cause confusion in his organization. Personal assistants can also be a source of uncertainty if the executive fails to define their jobs so that their roles are understood by the rest of the organization.

An executive's personal assistants must not function as palace princes, accessible in varying degrees to other

organization officials and pleading the cause only of favorites. They must be the same to all men, and the executive must kill any tendency to manipulate the organization or to afford an entrance through the "back door." Equally fatal is reliance on them by the executive to the point that his outlook becomes limited and warped.

OPERATING AIDES. In addition to what the personal staff can do to save the executive time and energy, there will also be need in any large organization for the kind of assistants who can share his principal operating burdens. If the executive chooses such aides judiciously he can compensate for talents which he may not have and multiply several times the impact of his leadership.

If the job of the executive requires a high level of public leadership, extensive dealing with a legislative body, a large number of outside contacts, or the devotion of much time to evolving a program or to negotiations with other executives, or if his talents do not lie in the management of an organization, a general deputy responsible in the line of command for internal administration will be needed. A permanent deputy position is likewise desirable when the executive post is one that changes with political fortunes. To be sure, it is not possible to have such a deputy in all the situations where one could be used advantageously. In most city manager cities, for example, it is not often feasible for the manager to share his principal duties. The extent to which public attention is fixed on the centralization of responsibility in *the* city manager almost precludes the use of a double, although not of other types of assistants.

Short of a general deputy, the executive may utilize a principal assistant either as an operating aide or as a chief of staff, giving him varying degrees of responsibility, or he may divide his managerial duties with one

or more such assistants in a manner mutually compatible with the persons involved. The specific arrangements must be based upon the systematic analysis of tasks to be performed and of the personalities of the executive and the persons that can be secured to perform them. But even the best possible person will never fill the job as theoretically conceived.

However the matter is arranged, and it will always be difficult to work out smoothly, such assistants must think and act in terms that are appropriate to the organization at large. If they do not deal with matters that cut across the entire organization, they no longer serve as aides to the executive in his general leadership and management job but rather as operating heads of a group of specialized units. They then become preoccupied with segments of the organization and their work does little to contribute to the achievement of balance among the different parts. In the Federal Government, assistant secretaries in the departments are frequently used in this fashion—in the Interior, Commerce, Post Office, and Justice Departments among others. Generally speaking, there has been under-development of the general deputy or assistant type of post I am describing here, in state and local government as well as in the Federal Government.

TIME SAVING PROCEDURES. Apart from the help the executive can get by providing himself with staff to supplement or complement his own efforts, there is much that can be done to save his time if careful attention is given to the way in which documents, information, problems, issues are presented to him.

With a little ordinary care the amount of time the executive need spend on strictly informational material can be reduced to manageable dimensions. Summaries can be prepared for reports, lengthy memos can be briefed to

one page, papers dealing with related subjects can be brought together. I am currently using a simple device in my own organization which, though small, is one in which the flow of information is enormous. My executive assistant and assistant chiefs provide me daily with a memorandum entitled "daily intelligence" in which they enumerate the things that have happened that I should know about, matters that have come up which they have arranged for others to settle, and steps they are taking to deal with affairs in which they know I have an interest. I in turn use the same device in posting the Director of the Bureau of the Budget on things he should know about. This is a very elementary but useful arrangement.

The way in which this can be done in a vast organization is illustrated by the manner in which information is packaged and presented to the Army Chief of Staff and other principal officers in the War Department. A log of selected, important messages to and from the War Department and points in all parts of the globe is the first order of business each day, taking from 15 to 45 minutes. This is followed by a meeting, attended by the Chief of Staff and his Deputy, the Secretary of War, and the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, at which material on military operations throughout the world and on enemy developments and capabilities is presented and discussed. The data are organized by the Operations and Intelligence Divisions of the General Staff, and the discussion consumes from one-half to two hours. These daily informational routines are supplemented by a comprehensive system of briefing the Chief and Deputy Chief of Staff on all matters on which they must make decisions or on which they should be informed.

The Army also has an excellent system of long standing for standardizing the format and condensing the

content of reports. In almost every case the essentials are reduced to a two page memo, covering statement of problem, facts bearing on the problem, conclusions, recommendations. Explanatory discussion, if any, is put in appendices. When action is required, drafts of whatever documents may be necessary to carry out the proposals are attached. This system, referred to as "completed staff procedure," has permitted the rapid transaction of a great volume of business and has made it possible to get comprehensive studies made and implemented in short order.

Governmental executives generally could do much to simplify their lives by insisting upon the adaptation and development of this idea to meet their particular needs. More often than not, full implementation of a plan or recommendation will take a series of steps or actions. Each of these should be set up in a fashion to permit the executive to take action quickly. It is more economical of time for the executive to send documents back for change if need be than to try to make a decision on other than a specific basis. Too often executives are confronted with the statement, "Here's a problem," rather than, "I propose that you do this for these reasons."

This process of simplification should not, however, be carried to the point that the executive is deprived of the opportunity of deliberation on the facts surrounding the proposal with which he is confronted. It is not always feasible nor is it necessarily desirable to reduce proposals to one recommended course of action. When there are non-technical factors entailing judgment and perspective of a level to warrant careful attention by the executive, cut and dried solutions will handicap rather than aid him. He should have the opportunity to consider well thought-out alternative recommendations.

How He Communicates His Ideas

It will not profit the executive a great deal to be a genius in the management of his time, if he does not take steps to forge strong links between himself and the other elements in his organization. In this connection, the mobilization and indoctrination of his team of key subordinates must be near the top of any executive's agenda. When the executive sees to it that the persons in positions of responsibility have been selected and trained for the function of leadership, the way will be open for securing response to new objectives, policies, and methods. Without such a staff he will have a mob, not an organization.

If there is a free and open channel through which ideas and information can move both down and up, the influence of the executive can be felt all the way through the organization. This is not, of course, a one way process. If the executive is skillful he will take pains to develop to the utmost the ideas and suggestions coming from his staff, both because this is the way to strengthen the net product and because only in an atmosphere where there is mutual respect are the executive's views likely to carry their maximum weight.

The kind of person the executive happens to be also has a good deal of bearing on the amount of influence he has. He is a symbol to his organization, and in the case of the higher posts, to the public as well. His attitudes and actions, both private and public, will have an effect—indirect and subtle perhaps, but nonetheless important—on the attitudes of all within his organization. If his characteristics and actions excite admiration, his staff will unconsciously be motivated to respond to his leadership and ideas. If the contrary is true, the natural reluctance of individuals to adapt themselves to the re-

quirements of organized activity is likely to be thrice compounded.

ORAL COMMUNICATION. In small sessions with key officials, the executive has his best opportunity for putting over his ideas. The values of such sessions can be multiplied if, when feasible, the officials primarily concerned with the resolution of an issue bring with them a principal subordinate or two, and if appropriate staff officers are included in important discussions with line officers. Any such devices that will increase the likelihood of cross-fertilization of ideas without setting undue obstacles in the way of the expeditious handling of business should be encouraged by the executive. Furthermore, to the extent that the executive makes the most of his opportunities for meeting with groups of people rather than individuals, he will be able to extend the area over which his influence is directly felt. It is not always necessary for the executive to be present in person for this result to be achieved. One of his staff officers or assistants thoroughly familiar with his point of view and attitude can often represent him.

Meetings of this character are of enormous importance as a means of facilitating the forward movement of an organization. If as issues come to the top they can be thrashed out by the principals involved, all points can be brought out on the spot and the most effective answer nailed down. This speeds the handling of important business, and through the process of dealing in unison on organization-wide matters, the principals get to know each other and how to work together. The more this understanding is developed, the more readily they will team up voluntarily when special problems confront two or more of them.

STAFF MEETINGS. General staff meetings, if well planned and confined to subjects that are of common interest and concern, can do much to aid communication. They can bring about fuller recognition by each individual of his relationship to the larger whole, and the executive can use them to bring about a common perspective and to help him in knitting the organization together. Anyone who has attended an effectively conducted meeting has observed how much more readily ideas take shape and are acted upon when an easy means of exchange is developed.

I do not wish to suggest, however, that general staff meetings are of exceptional importance. They are only one of many tools in the management kit. It is often taken for granted that every executive should get his key subordinates together—the department heads of a city or state government—as a cabinet, at frequent, regular intervals. The only useful purpose of group meetings of this character is discussion of matters of common concern. There is no merit in bringing diverse officials together to consider matters that can be settled in the line of command. In a meeting of department heads with the governor, any discussion of the welfare director's problems would put the director of public works to sleep. If the head of the agriculture department started to bring up his problems, most of the rest would be bored stiff. The reason for calling key subordinates together should be to dispose of issues requiring their collective judgment.

Written Communications. Written communications are a generally understood although not too well applied method of conveying the executive's ideas from one level to another in an organization, and they can be an aid to his long range efforts to develop his institution. In many organizations subordinates down the line are deluged

with detailed instructions and regulations on every aspect of institutional life. Failure to credit staff with a certain amount of common sense and ingenuity will not generate mutual understanding and more likely than not will lead to complete indifference. In either event, the executive is not helped by the result.

On the other hand, there is only too apt to be a grievous lack of well thought-out statements issued by the executive outlining specific objectives, schedules of operating requirements, and definitions of responsibilities. However good a job the executive may do in dealing with his principals and however conscientious they may be about passing on the information they get from the top, this will not cover the situation entirely. Written communications are an important supplement in getting to the entire organization the basic outlines of policies and objectives.

As important as it is that policies, and also programs and methods, be translated into clear, written communications, these should not be relied upon to get an essential thought over without the assistance that comes from personal comment on their application. Furthermore, this is the only way there can ever be assurance that staff members read or at least become aware of the written word. Written communications are useful chiefly as a point of departure and serve their primary purpose, after the actual labor of thinking them through is completed, as a basis for a discussion or series of discussions with staff of the ideas or directions contained therein. They are particularly useful for the orientation and instruction of new members of the organization.

How He Harnesses His Organization

My comments to this point have been focused on the ways in which the executive uses and extends his personality, ideas, and time. This has largely left out of account the institutional framework through which he must function. None of his personal activities, negotiations, or dealings will amount to much if his institution is not so organized that he can get a firm grip on it at crucial points and at crucial times.

KEEPING UP TO DATE. Essential number one is that he must know what is going on in his organization. If he organizes for the purpose, he can keep track of the trend of affairs—weak spots and strong spots, emerging problems, bottlenecks, opportunities for progress. If he does not, he is likely to be at a loss in attempting to pursue a balanced program.

In the normal course of events he will be confronted with a vast array of paper: actions or letters requiring his signature, drafts of orders and regulations, proposed plans of work, reports of inspections or organizational studies, program appraisals, reports of progress, statistical summaries and interpretations, personnel documents, budget and fiscal analyses, *ad infinitum*. With the help of his assistants in organizing and controlling these materials, they can provide him with much grist for appraisal of the organization's operations.

The picture the executive gets in this fashion will be only a partial one and will lack a good deal of realism if he does not supplement these sources of information with others. Many of the gaps the executive can fill in for himself, through conversations and dealings with his subordinates, and in some fields of governmental work, through inspections. The state conservation commission-

er can see at first hand what is being done in the way of development and use of state parks and in the management of state forests. On the other hand, the head of an agency engaged in activities having little tangible or physical expression cannot rely very heavily on this device. A commissioner of internal revenue, for example, cannot learn much about the product of his organization by looking at the files of paper in process.

The executive's personal staff can help keep him posted on what is going on by passing on information that he might pick up himself if he could see more people. What I am referring to is spot news that may affect the organization and its work, information on breakdowns in the organization, on personnel maladjustments, reactions of particular persons to actions by the executive, new proposals or ideas in the making, complaints with which the executive may have to deal. They may learn of these things informally by contacts below the upper crust of the organization, and they may pick up some of them from conversations with or reports by both staff and line officers. The executive needs to differentiate between the significant and unimportant in this kind of stuff, which may often be little more than rumor or gossip. He must keep a check rein on it, and not let it offset the solid help which his general staff divisions can give him directly.

STAFF DIVISIONS. Perhaps the most important single tool the executive has in harnessing his organization and keeping it in focus is his general staff—the budgeting, program planning, personnel, organization and methods planning divisions. I do not include here service or auxiliary units such as statistical, procurement, and office services, as important and necessary as these may be. Neither do I include here accounting and legal services

which, while providing control mechanisms for the executive, are otherwise more akin to the service units than they are to the general staff divisions. It is true, however, that because of personal competence, as well as the fact that they engage in some general staff activity, the accounting and legal chiefs are often used by the executive for a variety of general staff responsibilities.

The staff divisions provide resources for the analysis and development of solutions of problems common to the whole organization. They provide a source of highest counsel and advice on matters about which the executive is uncertain or has reason to doubt the solution offered by an operating subordinate. They provide a general rather than a specialized viewpoint both in reviewing proposals made by the operating subdivisions and in evaluating the results of the work of such subdivisions. They can do much to help the executive bring the objectives of the organization into focus and get consistency of action. In addition, the employees of such divisions circulate around the entire outfit and provide one of the most fruitful means of gathering information and of securing understanding and acceptance of policy.

The executive needs the benefit of a group of staff advisers functioning in this fashion to help him in anticipating tasks to be done, in planning to meet contingencies that may be around the corner, in mapping out policy and program, and in working out fundamental organization and methods. Their value depends, however, on the way in which they function. They must stay in the staff role of advising, consulting, and coordinating and must avoid imposing their personal judgment on line officials on operating matters. Staff divisions can become a burden rather than a help if they diffuse the executive's line of command by dipping into operating work and if

they insulate the executive from other sources of counsel. That the temptation to move outside the staff realm frequently is not resisted is reflected in the common practice of having a large number of detailed transactions referred to the budget office or personnel office for review, transactions that involve no new policy questions. Perhaps the reason staff officers often insist on this is because it is easier to review the activity of others than to do creative work, or because they do not have the capacity to do staff work, or because they have never learned what real staff work is.

The staff divisions cannot fulfill their roles to the maximum if they move off on their own in separate directions. It is, therefore, essential that general staff activities be coordinated with each other. The executive or his general deputy may be able to supply this coordination. Sometimes this can be more readily achieved by placing the staff units under an executive officer or a chief of staff. The various staff elements can in this way be brought into focus by someone concerned with the management of the organization as a whole, and the total resources are more available to the executive. Furthermore, there will then be less likelihood of nonproductive competition for the attention of the executive, and the number of organizational units the executive must keep track of personally will be reduced.

But regardless of the arrangement, general staff functions must be directed by high level officers who have a considerable amount of free access to the executive, with the executive officer performing a facilitating function and providing the environment in which the executive can most easily tap the reservoir of ideas of the individual staff officers.

ARRANGEMENT OF LINE UNITS. The way in which the executive arranges the subdivisions of his agency or bureau will also have a lot to do with whether he is on top of or at the mercy of his organization. There is much common knowledge of how to organize operating subdivisions, and I shall not go into the question in detail. I should like to comment particularly on the relationship between the way in which the organization is put together and the executive's opportunity to act on significant issues.

For example, a small number of operating divisions will not necessarily mean that the executive is sufficiently free of detail that he can contribute the element of over-all perspective and influence. When there are so few or the establishment is so arranged that the executive is walled off from operations by many layers of supervision or the job of harmonizing and coordinating on major issues is pushed down to a subsidiary level, he may become the slave rather than the master.

Related to the question of too few operating units and the layers of supervision that this may entail, is that of the excessive independence that statutory provisions often give subordinate operating officers. When the functions of major division heads are defined by statute, the top executive is placed under a severe handicap in trying to manage what frequently become independent principalities. I recall the vivid comment of a Federal executive who complained that he had the impossible task of administering a federation of bureaus rather than a department.

In a different category are the complications that may ensue if there is too fine a breakdown of activities. Not only is he unable to hold the separate units within his span of attention, which leaves them floating on their

own, but those issues that do reach him may get one-sided or unbalanced consideration. Functions need to be so arranged that, to the maximum extent possible, varied points of view will be brought to bear and reconciled along the way. In recognition of the dangers of over specialization, up-to-date city health departments, for example, have moved away from the system of organizing public health nursing services on the basis of specialized types of work: tuberculosis, venereal disease, infant care. Units or districts consisting of a group of nurses able to meet varied problems and situations are in large measure self-coordinating and thus reduce the burden on higher administrative positions.

There is another disadvantage in agencies or units set up with relatively narrow functions. If the agency commands the support of a specialized or single purpose type of interest or pressure group, undue influence in one direction may be exerted on the executive, and it will be more difficult for him to keep his organization in proper focus.

Almost all of these dilemmas of internal organization have been faced at one time or another in organizing the housing functions of the Federal Government. In February 1942, the three major functions of loan insurance, mortgage banking, and public housing were brought together by Executive Order to form the National Housing Agency. In varying degrees each function has its own clientele including one or more interest groups. If any one of these functions should be reconverted to independent agency status, the executive of such a narrowly based agency would be subject to highly specialized pressures. The executive of a unified housing agency is in a far better position to balance off conflicting points of

view and emerge with a program which reflects the national interest.

Combining the mortgage banking and housing loan insurance functions with all the other loan activities of the Government would be equally undesirable from the point of view of carrying out a housing program. Such a move would facilitate credit policy coordination by the head of the agency but would complicate the job of executives of other agencies operating in the same functional field, as well as subordinate program objectives to fiscal considerations. The public housing chief could not, under these circumstances, easily reconcile housing credit activities with his program. The purpose of the Federal housing programs is adequate housing for all citizens. Consequently, a permanent agency encompassing all three housing functions holds greatest promise as a method of providing coordinated leadership over a comprehensive group of closely knit housing operations. This solution permits effective executive direction and control. It is for this same reason that credit agencies in the agricultural field have been placed in the Department of Agriculture, those concerned with foreign operations in the Foreign Economic Administration, and so on.

Is He a Success?

This discussion has touched on some of the things that the executive can do to harmonize and get the most out of the other elements in his organization. I have emphasized that this is the way that he builds up his influence in his organization and guides it toward its objectives. In closing, I should like to reiterate my earlier point that although the executive is not likely to succeed if he approaches his organization as something that is

his own to command, he is at no disadvantage as he takes up the role of leadership.

The fact that he is the repository of formal authority in his organization is a powerful asset in the business of developing his titular position into one of genuine force and strength. Furthermore, it is up to him at any one point in time to determine the issues which he wants to have referred to him for decision. Although he may not decide much in his organization, quantitatively speaking, his choice of the decisions that he should make will determine how his organization meets its major difficulties. The point is that for the most part, he must depend upon others; therefore to the extent that the entire organization moves within a commonly accepted framework it will develop some speed and assurance in its forward movements.

My comments have been directed in large part toward some of the methods by which this team relationship can be developed. I trust that these may have proved helpful by suggesting some of the aspects of the business of managing a government enterprise beyond those generally taken for granted. All of these devices and suggestions, however, will not prove any substitute for general aptitude in the business of getting people to pull together. The real leader does not consciously rely upon any pat method of exercising leadership and influence. This is something to which he will be sensitive by his very makeup. He will feel the pulse of his organization and will understand it as a whole rather than as a lot of separate segments. He will know whether he understands it by whether it is responsive to him. If he has this sensitivity, even if he is a neophyte, he will soon learn the tricks of the trade. If he doesn't have it, no

amount of boning up on what experience has taught us will help him much.

This can perhaps be illustrated by an analogy that is more suggestive than it is accurate. A person making his first public speech has little impression whether or not he is carrying his audience. By his 100th speech he should know. If he doesn't, he is not a real public speaker. If he does, he will adjust his performance in many ways in order to bring the audience and himself into harmony. And so it is with the executive in relation to his organization. A good executive gets the feel of situations by the way in which those with whom he deals respond to him, and adjusts himself and his staff arrangements accordingly.

IV

The Administrative Resources of a Region: the Example of the Tennessee Valley

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I

Throughout the world there is a ferment of new ideas about what can be done with nature's resources in the period of development after the war. In our own country there is talk in several river valleys about the need for doing something to develop the physical resources lying latent in the river—water power going to waste for want of dams and turbines, a dearth of commerce and trade because of the lack of a navigable channel at some seasons of the year, and the waste and destruction of floods at other times. There is more talk about the declining fertility of the land—on acres that in time past and for generations have broken records time and time again for high yields. In these same river valleys and on the adjacent slopes there is a new show of concern about the disappearing forests and the exhausted mines and quarries.

The basic importance of natural resources and their proper management and use is slowly but surely gaining greater understanding with more and more people. In many areas of our country a careless and wasteful neglect is beginning to show its effects in loss of population, declining income, and the sensed loss of opportunity now and for the future. The people are relating cause and

effect. They are beginning to insist that the science and techniques of resource conservation and wise use of their natural heritage be made known to them. As a result there is a new period of stocktaking, of cataloguing the resources of the country—area by area, valley by valley, region by region. Acres, trees, minerals, water resources, the rainfall, climate—the count is being made and recorded. The totals are added and shown in reports describing the potential opportunities that are at hand to be developed by and for the people. And each report in this series of a growing literature of the nation's resources strikes a note of great promise—new jobs, new life from the land, new industries, greater income, and happier living. In these reports the basis is being laid for a new era of development in this country and in other parts of the world. The revival of interest in our basic physical resources is almost like the discovery of a new frontier, a challenge to the initiative and ingenuity of aggressive and progressive minds and courageous hearts.

But too frequently the glowing pictures of what a better use of resources can provide in terms of better living omits reference to one very important factor. In too many instances there is failure to treat at all of the difficult and vital problem of what it takes to get a program of resource development under way. Very little is said about what it takes to equip the people to put their own hands to the resources right at their feet—idle and wasted power in our rivers, powers of greater growth slipping from wasting soils, timber cut and slashed for want of the "know how" of forest management for permanent yields.

Rivers do not harness themselves, minerals do not spring full blown from the hills complete with processes in blueprint for the businessman who would convert the

raw ores into usable materials or salable products. Lands do not obtain a restored fertility of their own accord while being cropped and mined by man without regard to nature's laws. Forests do not find their way to new uses, new products, nor do they replenish themselves in the face of neglect and exploitation. Nor do men and women suddenly and overnight find available to them an easy and handy formula by which they can become participants and shareholders in the full scale task of rebuilding a region.

Things have to be done. There is a long road between the inventory of the resources of a region and the programs of action. There is a great deal to be done between knowing what the resources of the region are and bringing into being the opportunities they suggest for a more abundant life. Much has to be done to make the physical treasures of a region yield new fertility in the land, new industries, new sources of energy to drive the wheels of factories, to light and heat the homes and to do the heavy work of the farm in relief of men and women.

The arrangements that need to be made, the steps that must be taken to change the promises of a report into the realities of everyday life require careful mobilization of every administrative and educational facility the region possesses—and a few new ones that have to be created.

The full development of a region for the benefit of human living depends as much upon the administrative or managerial resources of the region as it does upon the physical resources.

It is important, therefore, that we try to determine the essential administrative or managerial arrangements a region should have to make sure that its physical re-

sources deliver the opportunities of which they are capable in the hands of an organized citizenry. One way to determine the administrative facilities essential to the development of a region's resources is to define the task that must be done to put resources to work to turn natural wealth and nature's powers of growth and productivity into jobs and income.

What is the special role of public administration—the function of managerial leadership? The task of administration is to see to it that the facts about the wise use of our resources of water, soil, minerals, and the factors of climate are discovered and made available to become a part of the everyday decisions of people. As Dr. Paul Sears puts it:

. . . Since wise use (of resources) is a result of the way in which people carry on their daily work and manage their affairs, it must be brought about by making people understand the reasons for it and wishing to practice it, they must know the laws of nature upon which wise use is based and see that it is good for them and their children to observe these laws.¹

II

There is at hand a large-scale experiment in the very thing we are here discussing—the administrative task in developing the resources of a region. I refer to the Tennessee Valley and its administrative partner for the people of an entire region, the Tennessee Valley Authority. What has been going on in the Tennessee Valley for the past eleven years affords an example of the vital importance of adequate and suitable administrative arrangements in carrying on a regional program of resource development. I know of no better way to discuss the ad-

1. Paul B. Sears, *Man and Nature in the Modern World*. Mimeo. Oberlin College, 1944.

ministrative requirements of a region than to draw upon the experience of the Tennessee Valley. My observations will suggest only the more salient features of the administrative arrangements now at work in that area.²

In a very real sense those who participate in the Tennessee Valley program are living and working in one of the greatest laboratories in the world. To this region of the Tennessee Valley and the seven states within whose boundaries lies the watershed of the Tennessee River hundreds of observers from all parts of the world come to see and to study what is going on.

These many visitors from afar come to the Tennessee Valley to see how by a system of dams designed, built, and operated by a single agency for navigation, flood control, and the production of hydro-electricity, the once destructive waters of an entire river system can be harnessed to work for the people. They come to observe how the farmers individually and in whole communities are putting their depleted soils back on the road to restored strength and fertility. These visitors see and study the new uses to which cheaper and more abundant electricity is put in homes, on farms, and in the factories.

2. For an eloquent exposition of what the TVA idea is and an interpretation of the broad significance of what the Tennessee Valley and the TVA are doing, I urge you to read TVA Chairman David E. Lilienthal's book, *TVA—Democracy on the March* (Harper, 1944). For a shrewd and scholarly study and appraisal of the TVA and its administrative history, habits, and customs, I refer you to Dr. C. Herman Pritchett's *The Tennessee Valley Authority—A Study in Public Administration* (University of North Carolina Press, 1943). For encyclopedic, descriptive history, appraisal, and possible international application, Dr. Herman Finer's *The T.V.A.—Lessons for International Application* (International Labour Office, 1944) is the appropriate source. And if you want the story in dramatically simple text and breathtaking pictures of a valley at work and on the mend, you will find it in the recent book, *The Valley and its People—A Portrait of TVA*—text by R. L. Duffus, and containing many photographs by Charles Krutch (A. A. Knopf, 1944).

They visit the laboratories of the state universities and the TVA where they see new processes and new types of equipment being developed and tested for use in a system of improved farming and for new industries geared to the physical resources of the Valley.

Most of all, perhaps, these visitors come to study the way the job of rebuilding a region is being done; the "how," the method, the administrative arrangements that have mobilized a significant part of the human resources of the region and enlisted them in the task of building a stronger and more enjoyable regional community.

What these visitors see is more than dams to control floods, to make the river navigable, and to generate tremendous quantities of cheap electricity. They see more than improved farming practices carried on, they learn, on more than 30,000 private farms over the country, to test and demonstrate the effectiveness of new phosphate plant food products manufactured by the TVA at its chemical and munitions plants at Muscle Shoals.

They see all of these things and more. Beyond and behind all of these activities or programs the more discerning observers see a new kind of administrative arrangement, a coalition of the administrative resources of the region made up of the agencies of the states, the communities, and the federal government with thousands of individual citizens participating in a voluntary effort to discover and apply the principles and procedures best suited to the wise use of the region's natural resources. In the course of eleven years, by a process of trial and error, negotiation, consultation, agreement, the TVA and more than a hundred local, state, and federal agencies, scores of quasi-public service organizations, and literally thousands of Valley citizens, have arrayed themselves in a loose and flexible but tough federation of effort to put

the resources of the Tennessee Valley to work to produce more income for more people.

The arrangements among these federated forces of a great region have been designed to accommodate accomplishment in the light of this ever-present understanding: the future of the people of the Tennessee Valley and their neighbors on all sides is being affected for better or for worse by the decisions being made now, and hour by hour, day by day, year by year by millions of individual citizens as workers, landowners, farmers, employers, and businessmen.

These decisions are being made on the farms, in the homes, in the shops and offices, and in the markets. Taken as a whole—as a complex pattern of action by the people of a region—these day-by-day decisions are the most valid weather vane or barometer by which the future trend of the region can be predicted. Scientists, educators, researchers, engineers, administrators, and law makers can discover, report, exhort, persuade, argue, prove, and decree what needs to be done and what should be done to improve the general welfare of the people of the region. They can invent programs and promulgate activity firmly grounded on scientific test and observation. But all of these efforts are dependent for practical effect upon what goes on in the minds and hearts of the people who do things to the land, to the soil, to the forests, and to the minerals in the ground.

The task of administration and education is thus to discover, define, reveal, and translate the science upon which these millions of individual decisions should rest, placing it within reach of the men and women—citizens who decide, who do things. This task must be done with sufficient scope, volume, and speed to slow down, finally halt, and then reverse a long established habit of the

wrong kinds of decisions affecting natural resources. The inevitable momentum of change must be turned into progress by placing the lessons of science and technology in the hands and minds of the people.

What are some of the agencies of administration and education which with the TVA serve as partners with the citizens of the Valley in the task of building a better standard of living into the region? Let's call the roll of an illustrative sample to see of what the administrative resources of the Tennessee Valley consist.

There are the state, county, and local agencies of research and education of the seven states that lie wholly or in part within the watershed of the Tennessee River. These agencies include the state universities and the land-grant colleges, the agricultural experiment stations, the engineering experiment stations, the state extension services, library boards and libraries, innumerable school boards, teacher-training institutions, and many others. Out of the relationships with these agencies come the factual and scientific bases for programs of better land use. Through these agencies, in cooperation with the TVA, the facts developed by research, by investigations in the laboratories and from practical experimentation, are slowly but surely channeled into the everyday knowledge of more citizens—farmers, workers, employers, businessmen, housewives, and others whom these agencies were established to serve.

There are also the state, county, and municipal agencies whose functions are primarily administrative. These include the departments of health in the states and in the counties, the departments of conservation and park administration, the state and local planning boards and commissions, the municipal power boards and the rural electric cooperatives, some 130 of them, who distribute TVA

power to more than 500,000 customers. TVA has contracts and agreements with most of the agencies of this group—agreements covering the performance by the state and local agencies of specific activities which the TVA might otherwise carry on itself.

Then there are the many private and quasi-public organizations which include the labor unions and the farm organizations. There are the land-use associations in county after county where whole communities of farmers have organized to plan and carry on more effective use of their soil resources. There are the Chambers of Commerce and the many business and industrial concerns whose relationships to the TVA range from that of the user of TVA power to an arrangement which includes cooperation in the experimental development of new farm equipment, useful to the farmer of small means, or the development of a new process for using the minerals of the Valley.

There are federal agencies as well that are mobilized into this far reaching administrative arrangement whose primary function is to help citizens of the Valley put their resources to work. There are the various technical and scientific bureaus of the United States Department of Agriculture—the Bureau of Agricultural and Industrial Chemistry, the Bureau of Plant Industry, Soils, and Agricultural Engineering, and the Forest Service. There are the agencies of the Department of Interior including the National Park Service, the Fish and Wildlife Service, the Bureau of Mines, and the United States Geological Survey. There are the Army Corps of Engineers, the Ordnance Department, and the Chemical Warfare Service of the War Department. There are the United States Coast Guard and many others. Each of these federal agencies or bureaus makes its specialized services

available in the Valley program through its cooperation with the TVA, or through cooperation with state and local agencies, as for example, the Department of Agriculture working through the state extension services, as does the TVA.

Finally, there has developed in recent years a number of regional conference bodies and committees organized on the basis of a special subject matter or professional interest. These conference groups meet from time to time to consider problems from the standpoint of the region as a whole. Many of them have developed permanent and continuing administrative facilities to carry on the work of the conference group between meetings.

This is a new development in the Tennessee Valley. It has taken place in that period that followed the creation and early activities of the TVA. For example, there is the Valley Conference of land-grant colleges, directors of extension, directors of experiment stations of the seven Valley states, the United States Department of Agriculture, and the TVA. There is the Tennessee Valley Trades and Labor Council made up of some fifteen international labor unions of the American Federation of Labor Building and Metal Trades. There is the Annual Conference of Contractors and Distributors of TVA Power, the Committee on Southern Regional Studies and Education, the Tennessee Valley Library Council, the Committee on Southern Regional Training for Public Administration, and a number of other bodies of regional significance.

No better evidence could be cited to demonstrate the growing consciousness of regional unity than the emergence of these regional organizations. They comprise a new and invaluable asset, a new administrative resource of the region. The future progress of the Tennessee Val-

ley in all phases of resource use and development will depend very largely upon the effectiveness of these regional forums for fact finding, for analysis, for discussion, for planning, and for program agreement. Since the creation of the TVA more than eleven years ago the growth of this type of administrative arrangement is, in my judgment, the most promising administrative development the region has witnessed.

This list of the administrative resources of the Tennessee Valley is not a complete list, of course. It suggests, however, the scope and variety of administrative and educational agencies that are enrolled in a widespread and integrated regional effort to serve the people in the most fundamental way possible—to assist them in the development of their natural heritage of resources.

The objective in every one of these arrangements is to make it possible for the people themselves to build the know-how of resource use and replenishment into their daily habits and decisions. These agencies will have served well if the principles and practices of land use, forest development and management, water control and use, become a part of the living culture of families, communities, and eventually the entire region. In that way and in that way only can we be assured of a permanent base for human life.

III

What are the origin and nature of the arrangements by which the administrative resources of the Tennessee Valley region have mobilized themselves to do a regional job? We must start with the Act of Congress which created the TVA, defined its responsibilities and authority, and established the principles by which it was to guide its work. Congress created the TVA to

improve navigability and to provide for the flood control of the Tennessee River; to provide for reforestation and the proper use of marginal lands in the Tennessee Valley; to provide for the agricultural and industrial development of said valley; to provide for the national defense by the creation of a corporation for the operation of Government properties at and near Muscle Shoals in the State of Alabama, and for other purposes.³

Congress further authorized the President, who in turn delegated his assignment to the TVA, to

aid further the proper use, conservation, and development of the natural resources of the Tennessee River drainage basin and of such adjoining territory as may be related to or materially affected by the development consequent to this Act, and to provide for the general welfare of the citizens of said areas" . . .

and to carry out the general purposes of

(1) the maximum amount of flood control; (2) the maximum development of said Tennessee River for navigation purposes; (3) the maximum generation of electric power consistent with flood control and navigation; (4) the proper use of marginal lands; (5) the proper method of reforestation of all lands in said drainage basin suitable for reforestation; and (6) the economic and social well-being of the people living in said river basin.⁴

Thus the TVA was charged with a specific physical, engineering, and operating job in connection with the river, but, in addition, it was admonished to assume a broad responsibility and a pervasive concern for the development of the Tennessee Valley region.

It was clear that this new administrative agency was not to be just another operating organization. The President, in his message calling for the enactment of the late Senator Norris' long debated dream, said,

3. 48 Stat. 58.

4. 48 Stat. 69.

I, therefore, suggest to the Congress legislation to create a Tennessee Valley Authority—a corporation clothed with the power of government but possessed of the flexibility and initiative of a private enterprise. It should be charged with the broadest duty of planning for the proper use, conservation, and development of the natural resources of the Tennessee River drainage basin and its adjoining territory for the general social and economic welfare of the Nation. This authority should also be clothed with the necessary power to carry those plans into effect. Its duty should be the rehabilitation of the Muscle Shoals development and the coordination of it with the wider plan.⁵

The majority report of the House Committee reporting the TVA Bill recognized clearly that it was proposing to establish more than just another agency. The report said:

It is a great responsibility imposed upon the members of the Board, but it is a great opportunity that will come to those chosen for this great service. For such position of trust and responsibility, undoubtedly the President will search the nation over for the right man to whom to entrust not only this vast investment of money but this great responsibility not only to the people of that section of the country, but to the people of the whole nation. If, through the incapacity or the indifference of the members of the Board, this great humanitarian project should fail, then progress along this line in other parts of the country will be set back for two or three generations.⁶

The TVA recognized that discharge of a responsibility as broad as the future of a great region would require a host of allies. No single agency working alone could make much headway with a job so gigantic. Success would depend upon getting as many people as possible to make the task of regional development their own job.

5. 13d Cong., H. Doc. 15.

6. 73d Cong., H. Rept. 48, p. 11.

Thus in 1936 TVA reported: "The planning of the river's future is entrusted to the TVA. The planning of the Valley's future must be the democratic labor of many agencies and individuals, and final success is as much a matter of general initiative as of general consent."⁷

The record of relationships between the TVA and hundreds of federal, state, and local agencies in emergency and continuing cooperative efforts is open to any student of the subject who wishes to explore it. The TVA acknowledges without reservation the part these arrangements have played in the progress made thus far in the Tennessee Valley. But I would emphasize the hard work it requires on the part of some one to get other agencies enlisted in the task of regional development. I emphasize this for an important reason: anyone who will take the time to analyze the history of this effort in the Tennessee Valley to enroll the administrative resources of the federal government, the states, the counties, and the local communities in the job of regional development will realize that individual agencies seldom try consciously of their own accord to fit their efforts into the stream of actions that shape a region's destiny. Any administrative agency invariably builds its program to reflect the view of service held by the people it serves in the area of its own domain.

This is as it should be. An administrative agency should be responsive and accountable to the people who give it life to serve them. But administrative insularity can be carried too far. Responsibility to a constituency need not be a disintegrating influence or a factor of popular division. A local activity unchanged except for the acknowledged fact that it is a part of a regional ef-

7. TVA Annual Report, 1936, p. 2.

fort can acquire increments of prestige, quality, and spark felt before long in a dozen ways in an enlivened and inspired community. The community, working with the state agencies which in turn are cooperating with other state agencies, draws strength from the thinking and administrative momentum of an entire region. The regional concept and the combined thinking and propulsion of many localities, communities, and local and state agencies nourish and energize each other. But it takes some one agency whose primary responsibility runs to the region as a whole to perform these marriages of interest that link the efforts and thinking of a small community to the thinking and aspirations of the people of a region.

What I have been describing is referred to by the administrative experts as "integration." Integration is a great thing. It is a word out of the magic of chemistry or biology. It is not a phenomenon of mathematics. Integration describes the process by which two and two are added to make more than four. And this is done without changing either of the original components of the sum. In the lexicon of regional administration it is the key word of the whole vocabulary. For without integration and all that it implies human effort would be powerless to mobilize itself to do a job bigger than what one man can accomplish in his own garden or his own shop. Without an "integrator" regional development just does not happen. This the history of this country and of the Tennessee Valley region clearly demonstrates.

In the Tennessee Valley the regional federal corporation, the TVA, is the "integrator" in the program of resource development. That is why Congress created the TVA. No existing agency had a mandate to find and train men and women qualified by background, expe-

rience, and temperament to undertake the task of making a federal agency serve a whole region by helping state and local agencies become stronger in their service to the people. No existing agency could legally and administratively devote its thinking, its time, and its staff to such a responsibility. And unless there is some integrating agent the forces of local responsibility will be inclined to estop the development of a regional concept, discourage a regional orbit of activity, and impede achievement of a regional objective commensurate with what the physical and administrative resources could otherwise accommodate. Successful integration strengthens the cooperating parts of the whole and deliberately builds strength into the smallest units of administration. Thus in the Tennessee Valley the development of a strong regional unity has in fact strengthened and added to the functions of the state and local agencies. The published appraisals of outside qualified observers are quite clear on this point.

Proposals for regional resource development programs which overlook the need for an agency of integration will prove deficient in the most fundamental particular. The administrative resources of the states and localities of any river valley, any region can be added together in mathematical sums. Existing staff and facilities of federal, state, and local agencies may provide everything necessary for the specific activities encompassed in a regional program. The state and local agencies can be supplemented *ad infinitum* by federal bureaus and departments each with its interest in a special program in the region. But unless there is a full-time integrating influence charged with responsibility for viewing the region as a whole the administrative increments essential for success will not materialize. Anyone who has wit-

nessed and participated in the laborious, undramatic, and painstaking task of formulating a regional concept out of a synthesis of hundreds of localized problems and negotiating that regional concept into hundreds of localized activities and programs can testify that integration is not achieved by accident. There must be a conscious, deliberate effort to "integrate." The Tennessee Valley experience demonstrates that this can best be assured by a compelling statutory responsibility by which the people of the whole region and the nation are able to exact from one single regional agency a full accountability for a regional result. There must be some one agency assigned to worry about all of the resources of the region.

Inventories of the resources of the regions of the United States will continue to be made. Reports will be prepared after extensive surveys. They will contain valuable data packed with the promise of great things to come. But physical resources will not develop themselves. There are always the ways, the purposes, and the needs of the people—the "human element." And where there is the human element, there is the need for administration, for management, for education, for integration.

If a region is ambitious for its future it will look not only to its rivers, its hills, and its valleys but to its people. And from and among its people and through its government the region will mobilize administrative resources commensurate with the scope of its vision.

V

Field Organization and Staff Supervision

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The geographical factor in administration has long been recognized. Before any well developed theories on bases of work specialization were formulated by students of organization, the peculiar claims of area were more or less well understood. The reasons are obvious.

You cannot provide a mail service to the inhabitants of the United States with post office personnel located exclusively in Washington. You could not defend settlers in border states one hundred years ago with military forces located in Maryland and Virginia.

It scarcely seems desirable to have all imported merchandise shipped from ports to Washington for the collection of duty before shipment to the consignee. "The whole purpose of the existence of Federal agencies is to perform public services, to benefit or serve individual citizens, and this means dealing with citizens where they are, that is, in the field."¹

For a while general interest in field organization tended to center in two particular aspects. One of these was machinery for bringing about field cooperation in such matters as rental of office space and the use of storage facilities. For a time also the National Emergency Coun-

1. Donald C. Stone, "Washington-Field Relationships" in *Washington-Field Relationships in the Federal Service* (Washington: Graduate School, U. S. Department of Agriculture, 1942), p. 15.

cil, and later the Office of Government Reports, ran a central information office in each state on federal government activities and services. Suggestions for the improvement of this type of work were included among the studies of the President's Committee on Administrative Management.²

The second interest was in the geographical area for administrative operations. Such problems emerged as the desirable number of areas or regions, the location of headquarters cities, and the possibility of creating common areas and headquarters cities. A study by the National Resources Committee found that there were 108 different district patterns used by federal agencies. There were 74 bureaus and other offices with definite regional boundaries for defining the jurisdiction of their field agents.³

In this early attention to government field organization, little concern was voiced about the large number of separate field offices spawned by each bureau and even by divisions within bureaus. No comment was excited because each bureau in the Department of the Interior, for example, had its own independent field offices, or because individual branches within a single bureau like the Bureau of Mines had separate field offices. Nothing unusual, apparently, was observed in the arrangement whereby the War Department had nine corps areas in the United States, while the supply arms and services of the War Department had their own independent procurement planning district offices. The report of the National Resources Committee listed in an appendix with-

2. James W. Fesler, "Executive Management and the Federal Field Service," President's Committee on Administrative Management, *Report with Studies* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1937), p. 275.

3. See National Resources Committee, *Regional Factors in National Planning* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1935).

out comment the numerous field offices of various bureaus and other government agencies.

This bureau practice of creating separate field organizations was observed 20 years ago by W. F. Willoughby. He described the situation as "multiple" overhead direction. He labelled the contrary method of organizing field activities as "unitary" overhead direction.⁴ These terms are not too satisfactory, for they do not clearly suggest the alternatives. Arthur Macmahon and I have proposed two other terms—"decentralization by specialty," to describe the arrangement whereby various field offices stem from different divisions and bureaus; and "decentralization by hierarchy," to describe the organizational structure which descends from a central administrator in Washington to a regional administrator in the field who has the same range of activities as his superior but confined to his particular area.

Macmahon and I have already mentioned the rival claims of hierarchy and specialty in field organization. We have expressed our own opinion that it is time for students of administration to recognize and proclaim boldly a theory of dual supervision. The common appreciation throughout an administrative structure that supervision can and does come from different sources would do much to reduce the friction between hierarchy and specialty.⁵

My own personal experience and observation from four years service within the government and the Army have led me to believe more strongly than before that the "theory of dual supervision" is a vital organizational

4. W. F. Willoughby, *Principles of Public Administration* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1926), p. 155.

5. Arthur W. Macmahon, John D. Millett, and Gladys Ogden, *The Administration of Federal Work Relief* (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1941), ch. 11.

concept. It is not clearly and generally understood, although in practice it is a real, if sometimes faltering, force. More than this, I am strongly convinced that only in the theory of dual supervision will we find the means of building an integrated field structure for administrative operations. For this reason I wish here to explore some of the aspects of field organization and staff supervision.

Not Solely a Federal Problem

At the outset, let me emphasize that this problem of field organization is not exclusively a federal concern. It exists as well in state and local government. For example, the relations between the head office of a city school system and the individual school buildings represents usually decentralization by hierarchy. On the other hand, in large cities with health stations scattered throughout the metropolis, you are likely to find decentralization by specialty—individual T. B. stations, individual V. D. stations, and individual maternity and child care stations. State governments face similar problems of field organization in road construction and maintenance, in their social security operations, and penal administration—to mention three widely scattered fields.

The use of federal examples in this discussion is prompted solely by reasons of convenience. The problem is a universal one in the conduct of large activities: it is to be found in business even as in public enterprise. No one concerned with organizational structure can be unaware of the widespread character of this problem of field-headquarters relationship.

The Case for Field Integration

In the first place, the question naturally arises: Why is field integration desirable? What is so unsatisfactory

about decentralization by specialty? If it is "unusual to find the unitary type of field direction employed for an entire organization such as a department of the national government,"⁶ why make a change?

The case for field integration in its broad aspects has been presented in these terms.

The advantages of departmentalization on the basis of geographical areas . . . are fairly obvious in practice. They consist first of the greater ease of coordination of services rendered and controls exercised within a given area; second, of the greater tendency to adapt the total program to the needs of the areas served, not alone because of the discretion resting within the division, but also because the needs and differences of the areas will be more vigorously represented at headquarters in the general consideration of broad policy; and third, of the greater ease with which cooperative relations may be established with subordinate governmental units, which are of necessity first of all geographically defined units. Decentralization of geographical divisions strengthens these tendencies, and serves, moreover, to reduce travel costs, short circuit adjustment problems, cut red tape, speed up all joint activities and administrative decisions. It increases not only the awareness of the officials to local needs and to the interrelation of service and planning problems, but develops a new sensitivity to the process of democratic control through intimate association of the officials with the people served.⁷

These generalizations need some elaboration. It seems to me that the need for geographical integration of field services is becoming more pressing than ever before. Accordingly, the subject deserves careful attention, free from a blind inclination to do as before.

6. David B. Truman, *Administrative Decentralization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1940), p. 17.

7. Luther Gulick, "Notes on the Theory of Organization," in Luther Gulick and L. Urwick, *Papers on the Science of Administration* (New York: Institute of Public Administration, 1937), pp. 29-30.

It is scarcely necessary to observe that the scope of Government services has expanded manifold since the last war, and that the numbers of persons affected by these operations has multiplied several times. It seems unlikely that our Federal Government will contract after the present war to a level of activity equaling that of 1939, let alone of 1929. Practices that occasioned few comments when government was small may arouse antagonism when Government activities play a larger role in our everyday life. In other words, the size of Government operations and the number of people affected must now become important factors in our judgment about desirable organizational practices.

There are at least three considerations which I believe deserve careful attention in determining field structure. One is administrative overhead—that is, the cost involved in maintaining field offices. The second is area served: does the area in which operations are conducted have certain well-defined characteristics which introduce a common thread into all activities performed there? And the third is people served: is the clientele of various services within a geographical area the same? I want to mention each of these in turn.

Administrative Overhead

Wherever a field office exists, there are certain jobs to be done for its maintenance. It must hire staff, prepare payrolls, operate a mail and messenger service, maintain files, police the premises, store office and other supplies, keep accounts, prepare and submit budget estimates, and perhaps keep up one or more automotive vehicles. These are the overhead or institutional activities which every administrative agency must perform, regardless of the substantive job it does.

When separate field offices exist in the same city, each has its own staff handling these housekeeping duties. Thus, for one bureau of the Department of Agriculture there were in 1940 six different divisions each maintaining an office in Chicago. In addition, four bureaus had a total of eleven field offices there, none of them with any organic relation to another.⁸ This type of situation suggests to the administrative analyst at once that desirable economies may be achieved by consolidation of overhead services. The extent of the consolidation is a matter for individual determination.

Sometimes there are other common aspects in the work of district offices located in the same city. The War Department, for example, has had six procurement offices in New York City. Each of these offices has maintained a file of actual and potential contractors. There has inevitably been some duplication in these files, though the actual extent is not known. One set of records about production facilities might be maintained if there were a single procurement office in New York City.

Necessarily, a desire for management economies is not the only consideration in establishing a field structure. There may be other factors which are controlling. Yet as government activities increase, there is danger that a larger and larger proportion of total outlay may be absorbed in housekeeping activities. Possible economies therefore become doubly important. The less spent on internal operation the more there is available for the service to which an agency is dedicated. And improved management may help to refute charges of high cost in government service. Such charges, whether they are levelled at government expenditures, the number of government employees, or "bureaucracy" in general, are

8. See Truman, *op. cit.*, pp. 60 ff.

going to continue to grow in the next few years ahead.

We need to worry, really worry, about any organizational arrangement which increases the cost of government services. An unintegrated field structure (decentralization by specialty) should be immediately suspect. It needs unusual justification before it can be accepted as desirable.

It was this very concern about uneconomical house-keeping arrangements which led as long ago as 1921 to efforts at developing field cooperation. I have alluded to this experience already—a brief account will be found in the study prepared by James Fesler for the President's Committee on Administrative Management. Sometimes an agency has experimented with a regional business manager: the Resettlement Administration did this in 1935.

Neither device has proved satisfactory. The Federal business associations had a checkered but generally unsuccessful history. Regional business managers within bureaus or agencies have not had an outstanding record either. The reason is simple. Business managers need an over-all administrator on the spot, able to give orders to field officers and then enforce them. Otherwise the business manager can be ignored with impunity, especially when he derives his authority from some superior in a far distant headquarters.

Management economies are made possible only by integrated organization at the field level.

The Area Served

There are certain inherent conditions of physical plant or area of operations which also induce integration of field activities. The public school building in any sizable city is a field installation. The vocational department,

the music department, the social sciences, the physical education department and the other specialties are all brought under the common direction of the school principal. Here indeed is one of the best possible examples—an example we can observe in any of our own back yards—of integration of specialties under a general administration in a field establishment. The school building as such, and the fact that it usually serves a specific area, have contributed to this administrative arrangement.

The United States Forest Service is organized on the basis of decentralization by hierarchy. Each national forest is a unit in itself, encompassing such functions as timber management, range management, wildlife management, and fire control. The district ranger is the local chief, who is responsible in turn to a forest supervisor, a regional forester, and finally to the chief forester.⁹ The area factor has been a determining consideration in the organization of the Forest Service.

In the Army Service Forces during this war area has also played a major part in the administrative structure. The ASF is responsible for the operation of the large posts where ground troops are trained in the United States. Operation means running the water and the electric light systems, and managing warehouses storing all the variety of supplies used by the Army from ammunition to radio sets. It means a disbursing office, chapels, motion picture theaters, field houses, post exchanges, a post office, repair shops, fire stations, a communications center, and a hospital. All these are facilities which must be provided as long as troops are stationed at a post. Because this wide variety of services has in common the

9. Earl W. Loveridge and Peter Keplinger, "Washington-Field Relationships in the Forest Service," *Washington-Field Relationships in the Federal Service*, p. 23.

matter of location, the military post, they have been placed under a single administrative head, the post commander. Area has been the deciding factor here again.

It has taken strong determination from the top to keep the post commander in this position as general administrator. There has been a disposition at times to curtail his authority or sidetrack his position. But a system of financial accounts and of personnel control has been installed which emphasize that the post commander is the local administrator. Integration at the local level is the basic feature in the field organization of the ASF.

Above the post commander is the Commanding General of a service command, of whom there are 10 in the United States including the Military District of Washington. Here again determined efforts have been made to keep the service commander as the regional administrator of ASF activities. The need for area coordination of these services can be realized only through an organization structure of decentralization by hierarchy.

Clientele Served

There is yet a third major factor in favor of area integration of activities. It is the clientele served by a division, bureau, or agency. If the same people are provided a number of different services, some integration is highly desirable.

The convenience of the persons served is no unimportant administrative consideration. It should become of increasing concern to all administrators. Just the other day I noticed in a local newspaper a complaint about the number of different offices to which a person in business had to go to obtain all his licenses and other permits. In this case the state officials promised to consolidate

at least some of the offices and thus lessen the number of different places where citizens had to go.

The "run-around" may have been a satisfactory government practice in yesteryears, but it will not do for a service government on a large scale. This is a lesson that administrators should be quick to appreciate.

The WPA as it operated from 1935 to 1942 was organized along geographical lines. In fact, state boundaries were used also as WPA operating boundaries. The reasons for integrated field organization were several. Among them were considerations of close relationships with state and local Government, and with the relief population, both of whom the WPA served. The projects operated by the WPA were sponsored by state and local Government agencies. In addition, state or local relief agencies certified persons as eligible for work relief employment. In order to emphasize these relationships, the WPA was organized so that, with one exception, state and district offices represented all phases of WPA activities.

Other examples of organization on a geographical basis prompted by considerations of clientele will readily occur to the reader. Where the clientele of an agency is likely to be a well-defined group, then separate field offices may become a source of major administrative embarrassment.

Integrated Organization and Multiple Activities

It has been suggested that a tremendous variety of technical functions usually forbids an integrated field structure. Multiple purpose agencies, it is said, cannot easily be organized on the basis of decentralization by hierarchy.¹⁰

10. See Truman, *op. cit.*, pp. 58-59.

One is tempted to inquire whether integration in Washington can be logically defended if integration in the field is obviously undesirable. The same forces which have made departments into more than mere expressions may also be reflected in the field, and may urge integration there likewise. Of course, many a move in the direction of agency consolidation takes a long time to perfect. The new top administrator finds in fact that he may have to proceed cautiously toward real administrative integration.

But this type of slow progress is a matter of expediency, not of desirable organizational structure. Obviously no man, and no administrator, can ever have all he wants. Compromises must be made. There are pressures that surround many agencies, and there are special groups which question any move that might make an agency less responsive to its own demands. Thus when integration takes place in Washington, it may be a long time before that integration appears in the field. In reality the new chief administrator may only be the head of an uneasy confederation.

This situation, however, should not be dignified with a theoretical justification. Let us acknowledge frankly that when we set up a Federal Security Agency, for example, or a National Housing Agency, we have merely tied together the top heads of previously independent agencies. It will take a long time to work out a real operating structure under the new arrangement. And so it will take a long time to obtain an integrated field structure. The mere fact that there are many different programs does not necessarily justify decentralization by specialty.

There is little in common as far as programs go between range management and timber management in our

national forests. There was not much in common in the WPA as far as programs go between a construction project in city parks and a school project operating in a city school. The common threads in these cases, as already suggested, are not programs or activities, but area and clientele served.

Personally, I question whether the existence of multiple programs is a justification for an unintegrated field structure. I think the explanation probably lies elsewhere. Certainly, I cannot imagine more diverse activities than running a motion picture theater and a hospital on an army post. Yet these have been brought under the direct responsibility of a post commander.

The Role of Specialty in Administration

This emphasis upon field integration is not to be construed as inherent hostility toward professional specialties in public administration. These specialties are vital. They reflect basic divisions in the knowledge, skill, and capacity of individuals. Technical experts are essential to every administrative agency, including one whose primary basis of organization is geographical.

Only gradually are administrators and students coming to realize that technical relationships within an agency are just as important *in their sphere* as the so-called "normal" lines of command. It was this fact which led Macmahon and me to propose a theory of dual supervision. We felt that it was time to recognize and accept this reality.

I should like to illustrate these generalizations by an example from the Army Service Forces. One of the staff officers of the Commanding General, ASF, is the Surgeon General. He is the principal medical officer in the ASF, and in the Army as a whole. Yet the general hos-

pitals of the War Department are administratively under the commanding generals of service commands and station hospitals are under post commanders. Certainly hospitals, and medical care, represent a very highly specialized field of activity. Why should not all hospitals be run then solely by the Surgeon General?

A general hospital is a military post. As such it has problems common to all military posts. For example, it must have a post engineer, a post exchange, a message center, food facilities, all kinds of supplies, and a disbursing office. Not so long ago I sat down with the commanding officer of a large general hospital, and the problems he was worried about included guards for prisoners of war doing maintenance work around the hospital, the discharge procedure for soldiers who had received maximum medical care, and recruitment of civilian personnel. These are problems of other military posts besides hospitals, and service commands exist to help post commanders in meeting them.

For similar reasons the station hospital at a military post is under the post commander. The latter officer does not pretend to tell the hospital under what conditions to use penicillin, or when to administer blood plasma, or when to operate. Those are decisions only the medical personnel can make. The post commander does have authority over storage arrangements for supplies used by the hospital, the hours for civilian employees, the conditions under which prisoners of war may be used on the hospital ground, trash and garbage collection, arrangements for the pay of the enlisted men employed in the hospital as orderlies, and similar aspects of post administration.

The post commander does not try to determine whether the hospital medical personnel is competent in the

field of surgery or internal medicine. Nor does he determine the part that physical therapy is to play in medical treatment. The role of occupational therapy is another problem that the post commander does not decide. The medical competence of a post hospital and of a general hospital is determined in the first instance by the chief surgeon of the service command. He is a staff officer of the commanding general. It is his job, however, to inspect medical care as such. If he finds something wrong, he can correct it in the name of the commanding general of the service command.

Finally, the Surgeon General decides whether service commands and posts are doing competent medical jobs. He supervises training, he inspects, he calls for reports, he prescribes methods of treatment, he experiments with new types of therapy or drugs at particular hospitals. In the medical field, the Surgeon General is boss. In the administrative field, he is part of a larger organization.

In other words, the Surgeon General is a typical staff officer to the Commanding General, ASF. In his specialty he develops programs and plans—he is the final authority on matters medical. His judgment about DDT, or malaria control, must be and is accepted. But on questions of supply, construction, use of prisoners of war, pay, discharge, transportation of wounded, and similar subjects the Surgeon General works with others, and disagreements must be referred to the Commanding General for decision.

The Surgeon General, as I have remarked, is a staff officer, but that does not mean that he makes no decisions or exercises no supervisory authority. He does. The staff adviser is also a supervisor. The Surgeon General deals directly with the chief surgeon of service commands and

in turn with post surgeons. When a new chief surgeon is desired by a service commander, he turns to the Surgeon General for advice and actual selection. This is what I mean when I speak of "dual supervision."

An agency which establishes geographical area as its major basis of operations, which is decentralized by hierarchy, must have an adequate functional staff at the central headquarters. To be sure, area organization facilitates local adjustments to meet local conditions. Some variation in activities from place to place is expected, and is desirable. But there are national standards to maintain also. Sizable variations in services from one area of the country to another are not justified, certainly not in a national program.

In this country we are proud of the individual characteristics which differentiate New England from the Corn Belt, the southern Tidewater from the Great Plains, the Appalachian Piedmont from the Rocky Mountains, Louisiana from California. We are at the same time proud of the United States as a whole. Economically, we are a single unit. The prosperity of any part is dependent upon that of the whole. We desire equality in opportunity and in advantages. There is no such thing, for example, as one standard of medical care for a soldier stationed at Fort Benning, Georgia, and another for a soldier at Fort Lewis, Washington. There are individual differences in soil and terrain between the Appalachians and the Rockies, but there cannot be a forest conservation program which denudes one region and fosters an abundance of trees in another.

There are national standards to be maintained in national programs. Central staff supervision and direction is therefore essential. The size of such a staff must be determined in each agency. It should not be too large,

yet must be adequate to perform its functions of planning, instructing, inspecting, and checking upon results. When a staff is too large, it inevitably desires to centralize many functions and thereby assume operating responsibilities. This is a tendency that must be checked, if geographical organization is expected to be the operating basis of the activity.

It must be realized that staff work means more than such institutional services as budget, personnel, and office management. There is another phase of staff work—what we may call functional supervision. The actual staff units in an agency will vary with the work performed. Thus in the U. S. Forest Service the headquarters office has functional staff units in the fields of range management, timber management, and fire control. In the WPA there were supervisory staffs for engineering projects and professional, or white collar, projects. In the Army Service Forces there are supervisory staffs for medical service, personnel services, supply services, communications service, and other activities, all of which are performed on a geographical basis.

Many different kinds of specialists may be found in the staff arms of an administrative agency. Their counterparts actually doing the job will be found in the operating units of the administrative hierarchy. These specialists are expected to promote the highest possible standards of performance within their specialty.

The objective of administration, however, is more than the performance of many different specialties. There is usually a goal which can be achieved only by the successful blending of these specialties. That goal may be the conservation of our forest resources, the provision of useful work to the needy unemployed, or the operation of all the services needed to support the training of sol-

diers in the United States. The specialties must be expected to contribute to the common objective. If each were to go its own way, the result would more likely be chaos than accomplishment.

The problem of all administration may be posed in these terms, to utilize special techniques and skills to the fullest degree in realization of assigned objectives. The solution of this problem, I believe, lies in dual supervision throughout an administrative structure. The specialist has his role to play, and the general administrator has his.

The Role of the General Administrator

What exactly is the general administrator expected to accomplish? Why have a regional or local administrator in charge of an integrated organization? The customary answer is to say that the general administrator exists in order to achieve coordination of the specialists. Such an answer does not go far enough.

Coordination is a loosely used expression. Its basic weakness is that it refers to a technique, a means, and only by association to an objective, or end. The purpose of general supervision, as I have already suggested, is to accomplish the mission entrusted to the organization as a whole. In other words, the administrative head is expected to see that the parts add up to the total job to be performed. But in truth this can be done without the general administrator. What cannot be done is this. The parts, the specialties, must add up to a total job *with the least possible cost in the use of our resources, of men and materials*. The objective of coordination, of general administration, is the highest possible degree of efficiency realizable, the maximum of output to input.

For one thing, the general administrator is greatly concerned about the overhead services required. Let me

cite an example. Just recently I visited two large field offices of the same parent organization in Washington located in the same large city in the South. Each office had about the same number of employees, numbering around 1,600 or 1,700 persons apiece. Of this number, over 270 persons in one were performing administrative services. The two largest sections were keeping fiscal accounts and civilian personnel records. It was estimated that a merger of the two offices would permit a reduction of at least one-third in the total personnel engaged in all overhead services.

The general administrator is responsible for managing the overhead services and seeing to it that they render satisfactory assistance to the specialists. He also has another job to perform. He is the person who must keep in close touch with the clientele of an agency as a whole. If you wish, you may say that he is the "front man." He personifies the organization. He must be able to say that the various phases of a program will be carried out on schedule. Thus the post commander under the Army Service Forces is the individual who represents the total of ASF activities provided to ground troops on a post. He means hospital service, supply service, communications service, recreational service, repair service, and all other work. If something goes wrong, he is the person on the scene who has the authority to take corrective action.

There is a third phase of the responsibility of the general administrator. No matter what the specialty, it will have certain relations with other specialties in a program. The disbursing officer is concerned with the way civilian payrolls are prepared. The supply organization may have a sudden jam in unloading freight cars: common labor may then be shifted from maintenance of roads. In the

forests, for example, forest management personnel may be shifted to handle a sudden problem in range use. The hospital on a military post may need more food at a particular time, or additional beds.

Wherever common interests arise between specialties, the general administrator is able to work out necessary adjustments. Internecine strife is forbidden. The successful general administrator is an individual who takes an active role in finding these common threads between services, who works out desirable solutions, and who maintains harmony at all times between the parts.

There are necessarily limits to the authority of the general administrator. He cannot claim to be a technical expert in many different fields, and he must so recognize. He may inquire how instructions are being carried out, but he must appreciate that in certain fields he cannot substitute his judgment for that of a specialist. I have given examples already. On many matters of purely technical scope, the general administrator must step aside. The local accountant must keep the records in the way his accounting superior directs. If he does not, the local manager will be told he needs a new accountant, or will be relieved because he interfered with accounting procedures.

There have been instances during the war when commanders of troops have been relieved of their command because they refused to accept the advice of their own specialists on certain technical matters. The specialists in turn were acting on the advice of superior technical specialists. It is not enough to say the instructions should have followed command channels. General policies and directions should, certainly, but many details may be handled more informally. They are still commands.

I grant it is not easy to draw the line between general

supervision and technical supervision. I have tried to indicate broadly the distinction. What we need now is to understand that there is such a thing as dual supervision, and to try to harmonize the two. The specialist needs to realize that the general administrator can do much to free his energies to cope with his particular concern. The general administrator must appreciate that the specialist is the authority in his sphere of competence, and that he is to be encouraged, not hampered, in his efforts.

Administration, like all life, is a matter of give and take. There must be compromises. Only thereby can we continue to advance. But the specialist must participate in the compromising!

Dual Supervision and Field Organization

I have put this emphasis upon dual supervision, upon the respective roles of the technician and the general administrator, for one simple reason. I believe the hope for further advances in the direction of an integration of field services depends upon the expansion of this conception of dual supervision.

The pressures of specialties are great. The case for integration in the field may suffer from inadequate pressure for economy and efficiencies in management. The pressures of specialties can be counteracted, I believe, only if it is made clear that field integration is not intended to curtail the freedom of the technician. Field integration is intended to help him play his part in a general program. There have been specialists who had so much freedom that they cut their own throats.

Dual supervision must go with decentralization by hierarchy. We must reassure the specialist at the same time that we set up the general administrator. Other-

wise, I fear we may move into an era of widespread administrative anarchy. This is not a prospect to view lightly.

The Beginning

Within the federal government, I am convinced, we should strive for appropriate integration of field activities, first within bureaus, and perhaps later within departments. We must take up each problem separately: the field structure of the Social Security Board must be studied before we begin to talk about the Federal Security Agency.

Within some departments an integration of all field work may not be desirable. There may be no unity of area or clientele served, no savings to be realized in overhead services. But by and large, if a department has any reality as an integrating force at the Washington level, it may well ask if the same values may not be needed at a subordinate geographical level.

Indeed, we might begin with physical consolidation of field offices. If we are to have a sizable federal public works program after the war, one series of projects might be intended to provide a large federal office building in the key regional centers. Past experience suggests that few forces promote field integration, or any integration, more successfully than common housing.

Perhaps we may eventually look forward to a Department of Agriculture in the Middle West, for example. Note, I say "eventually." Field integration is a long-range program for each bureau, and certainly for each department. It is a program on which all agencies should be starting now. Regionalization of the federal government as a whole may come some day, but I doubt if we live to see it.

Right now we shall have our hands full if we worry about field integration of those activities of bureaus and of departments with a common area factor, or a common clientele factor; and if at the same time we convince the specialist that he has his part to play when integration is achieved. That's a big program for any agency!

VI

Function and Area in the Administration of International Affairs

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The reconciliation of the conflicting claims of functional and of areal divisions is a universal problem of organization. The areal or geographic factor involves synthesis—the merger of all phases of the whole of a task or set of tasks that are to be performed in a given place as a complex of component specialities. In this sense the geographical basis of structure is integrative in tendency even at subordinate levels. The functional factor in organization, cutting through the geographical, represents the demand of specialties for distinctive consideration. Both factors are valid; few undertakings can avoid the necessity of using them in combination. The degree to which the consequent dilemmas are resolved and conflicts minimized is a prime test of organizational success.

The administration of international affairs is a fruitful laboratory in which to observe the perplexities that cluster in the problem of reconciling function and area. Here the emphasis is heavily geographical; areal divisions are of the essence. This would be true even if nation-states were not legally sovereign. Yet in the modern world international relations are increasingly functional in content. The diversified activities within nations are

reflected globally in subject-matter specialties that ramify across geographical boundaries. There is increasing need, therefore, for the careful prevision that will harmonize the two sets of factors.

The modest purpose of these pages is to illustrate the problem by considering three clusters of relationships. All concern national arrangements for the conduct of foreign relations, rather than international organization itself.

First, the problems of functional and areal jurisdictions are viewed from the standpoint of headquarters structure. This aspect involves the relationships within the State Department between units based upon geographical and upon functional categories. The strains of such relationships accompany the growing functionalization noted in all foreign offices. In addition, there are diverse national agencies that impinge on foreign affairs.

The second cluster of issues concerns the Foreign Service proper, and the field representatives of agencies other than the State Department. The Foreign Service, capped in each country by the head of the diplomatic establishment, seeks to approximate the status of a unified, global field service for the whole government of the United States. Such a claim is challenged by the direct projection abroad of numerous national agencies pursuing their special functions. The problem may be mitigated, of course, by various degrees of union in the field. But the main question is the extent to which specialization within the Foreign Service would enable it to fill the foreign needs of all parts of the government.

A third cluster of issues involves the channels within the national administration of the United States—both in the Department of State and outside it—through which the government deals with various classes of ques-

tions in connection with the several types of international association, general, functional, and regional.

I

The traditional subdivision of foreign offices has been geographical. In the State Department traces of an areal pattern were evident as early as 1833 in roughly regional assignments given to three clerks who then comprised the diplomatic bureau. The regionalism long remained relatively undeveloped and haphazard. Even under the notable reorganization of 1870, the countries of the world were divided rather promiscuously in two groups. A more orderly regional assignment was achieved in 1909. As this has evolved through 1944,¹ four regional offices are provided: European Affairs, Near Eastern and African Affairs, and Far Eastern Affairs, under one of the assistant secretaries; and American Republic Affairs, under the general oversight of another assistant secretary. Within each of these four offices is a varying number of "divisions" responsible for particular countries, for several adjacent countries, or (in the case of the Division of British Commonwealth Affairs) for a system of states. At the heart of the scheme is the ideal of what is still significantly called the "country desk"—the focus at the working level of the department for matters that affect a particular country.

Before passing to the relation of these geographically oriented offices to the functional units in the Department, it is worth pausing on the areal side of the problem to note the dilemma which in an imperial world attends the attempt to organize regional groups of "coun-

1. Departmental Order 1218 of January 15, 1944, modified by Departmental Order 1301, December 20, 1944. For the full text, see *The Department of State Bulletin*, vol. XI, No. 286A, December 17, 1944, Supplement.

try desks" for the handling of the flow of diplomatic and other business. Both sovereignty and proximity have different but strong claims for recognition. In the present organization of the State Department, sovereignty is still foremost as the principle of groupage, although with significant concessions to the principle of neighborhood. The Office of European Affairs has jurisdiction over the Far Eastern and Pacific possessions of European nations, qualified by the direction that such primary jurisdiction be exercised jointly with the Far Eastern Office. In the case of Africa, proximity is more respected. The primary assignment of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs extends to all places except the Union of South Africa, which is handled with other British Commonwealths in the European office, and Algeria, which as a department of France also belongs to the latter office.

The assignment of areas among the geographical offices of the State Department may have subtle effects on policy. Negotiations on important matters must be conducted with the home governments of imperial systems. But the personnel of offices such as Far Eastern Affairs may be more sensitive to changing conditions in the native world than divisions immediately involved in maintaining harmonious relations with European powers that happen to have possessions in Asia and the Pacific. Even with shared jurisdictions and the will to collaborate, it may matter which unit first receives papers for action, thereby gaining almost automatically the opportunity to initiate a decision. In the long run, no doubt, the autonomous movements of the present century will tend to emphasize the criterion of adjacency in the allocation of areas among the geographical offices of the State Department.

It is appropriate also to note how the regional approach is challenged by the super-regional. This angle of the problem touches the future administration of world security and especially national linkage to the United Nations Security Council. The tracings of channels already exist in the State Department's divisions on International Security Affairs, International Organization Affairs and, to a lesser extent, Dependent Areas—all parts of the office provisionally called Special Political Affairs. Thus far these units have been engaged in research preparatory to peace; they have provided American staff for the conferences; but they are likely to evolve into a permanent nucleus for current questions of policy and action.

But the main impact comes from the functional side. In the Department of State, as in other foreign offices, a growing number of units deal on a world-wide basis with particular subjects or processes, mainly economic, on the one hand, and informational, on the other. The growth of the economic staff was evident in the fact that, at the beginning of 1945, there were three economic offices (Financial and Development Policy, International Trade Policy, and Transportation and Communications) with thirteen divisions and about five hundred persons on the rolls.² The last figure may be contrasted with slightly over two hundred persons in the four geographical offices. Quantitative comparisons are risky, of course, espe-

2. The significance of five hundred persons on the economic side of the State Department is further emphasized by noting the modest though growing scale of the department as a whole. In 1913 the Department's personnel aggregated 250; it had risen to 750 by 1918. The number fell to a new low of 600 in 1929, stood at 900 in 1932, declined slightly thereafter but, in the course of a spectacular increase after 1939, rose to more than 3,200 on the rolls in January, 1945, not counting authorized positions still unfilled and about 1,000 additional positions sought in the new fiscal year.

cially in an agency like the State Department. Moreover, the discrepancy partly reflects mistaken economy on the part of the geographical offices, which have been slow to learn the use of staff and which tend to rely upon a few experienced persons, especially Foreign Service Officers on detail.³ Thus the several divisions in the Office of European Affairs comprised eight, three, two, six, three, and five persons. The progress of non-economic functionalization in the State Department was shown in the employment of about five hundred persons at the close of 1944 on what broadly may be termed information. Cultural cooperation had been given divisional status in 1938. Within the year 1944, the quickening recognition of information as an aspect of foreign affairs was signalized, first, by the creation of an office (Public Affairs) that included divisions on cultural exchange, international information, and public liaison, and, second, by assignment of an assistant secretary to this complex of activities.

Before considering the relations of the main geographical and functional units, it is useful to note the tendency of the latter to subdivide internally on an areal basis. Thus the division that administers cultural relations was reshaped geographically in 1944. Within the economic divisions there was subordinate recognition of regional factors in handling commercial policy, monetary and investment matters, and labor relations; only the internal structure of the unit on commodities was consistently functional. A grave question as to future emphasis arose

3. Half of the 126 Foreign Service Officers on duty in the State Department in 1944 served in the geographical offices. There were only nine in the economic and informational (including cultural) offices together. The law permits Foreign Service assignments to the Department for periods up to three years, which by special arrangement may be extended to four.

at the beginning of 1945 when the economic work of the department was reorganized incident to the appointment of a new assistant secretary and under the impetus of the overdue need to fuse the wartime and permanent activities. It was seriously urged that the whole economics personnel, except for aviation, shipping, and telecommunications, should be assembled by countries and regions, with a few high staff advisers on the several functional specialties. The proposal was advanced on the ground partly that the ultimate substance of foreign affairs lies between specific countries and partly that the trend during the next few years will shift the stress from the type of thinking, for example, that underlay multilateral trade agreements. But the functional emphasis prevailed. It is evident that the distinctive contribution of a segregated economics staff is to supply technical analysis and standards on a global or at least inter-regional basis. Otherwise all economists and other specialists might appropriately be absorbed in the geographical offices. The reasons that forbid this also require that such personnel shall be deployed in functional divisions, criss-crossed by internal geographical assignments and supplemented by liaison officers who can facilitate concerted attention to problems that involve particular countries.

Within and outside the Department of State, the approaches by area and by function must be harmonized. Synthesis is the high task of the geographical offices. The word "political" (traditionally applied to such offices) inadequately expresses the range of their concern, which properly covers the totality of governmental relationships of one society to another. Few if any questions remain purely technical. The transcendent need in any situation is to bring the full governmental resources to bear on its consideration. Sometimes this involves draw-

ing upon the advice of the appropriate functional divisions while action is in a formative stage; in such cases the economic divisions serve as expert consultants. Sometimes the staff relationship is reversed. The functional divisions are the action bodies. It is then the duty of the geographical offices to see that action is taken in the light of the whole situation existing between the United States and the country or countries involved. This must not be done—as has been attempted too often—by a grudging sort of detailed review. It is the opportunity as it is the obligation of the geographical units to run ahead of events and to indicate the frame of policy within which action affecting particular countries should be taken.

A suggestive statement of the duty of the geographical offices was set forth in the State Department's reorganizing order of December 20, 1944. "The geographic offices," it was said, "shall be responsible for the formulation of over-all United States policy toward the countries within their jurisdiction and for the coordination, as to these countries, of the programs and activities of other offices and divisions of the department, and of other Federal agencies, with over-all United States policy." To this end, eleven types of responsibility were listed. These included the direction that the geographical offices shall "develop basic country and area policies to guide the conduct of United States relations with such countries" and shall "guide the conduct of day-to-day relationships with the other countries, taking the initiative in affairs primarily political, and in other affairs stimulating the initiative of functional divisions in the department and of other agencies charged with primary responsibility in specialized fields."

It has been observed that the synthesizing role of the geographical offices of the State Department is not con-

fined to the department. The extent of the outside functionalization that impinges on foreign affairs was hardly exaggerated by the House Committee on Appropriations when it reported on February 16, 1944: "... it may safely be said that perhaps most of the agencies of the Government will have some interest in areas beyond the continental limits of the United States."

A fundamental future question is the degree to which functionalized foreign activities will exist as headquarters organizations outside the Department of State. Much depends upon the scale of the government's involvements and this, in turn, on the interaction of world conditions and domestic politics. Much depends, too, on the capacity of the State Department for flexible administration. In the past the department has eschewed "operating" responsibilities while it has been jealous about policy and somewhat clumsy in maintaining the distinction while bridging the gap. Historically it can be said that the department has hardly been suited for operations. Many who admit this do not accept it as a prescription for the future. They point to the department's inalienable responsibility for policy and the difficulty of separating policy from the operational situations in which policy inheres. The difficulty must be admitted. It does not follow, however, that with less of negative caution and a more positive and flexible conception of policy, guidance cannot be separated from many types of what are called operations. At the very least, enough foreign activities will survive outside the Department of State to require the development of attitudes and structures which will solve the dilemma of leadership by escaping the horns of indifference and of interference. The necessity always is to avoid duplication of judgment, whereby one technical decision displaces another. Consideration by the

State Department should be for the purpose of supplying the different and higher test of consistency with national foreign policy as a whole. Partly this may be done through multi-functional matrixes like the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy, an interdepartmental body created in 1944, wherein the State Department holds the chair and provides the secretariat in its economic staff. Ultimately the points of reference are mainly in the geographical offices.

II

Thus far the discussion has dealt with the interplay of area and function at headquarters. It is timely to pass to conditions in the field. Abroad are the problems of the Foreign Service as the distinctive custodian of areal representation, of its relations to functional agencies, and of its capacity for internal specialization. The familiar perplexities of single versus multiple field organization are complicated by the need for delicacy and consistency in contacts with other governments.

A

At the outset it is useful to recall the rise and unification of the career Foreign Service and the attempt in 1939 to fortify its exclusive role by absorbing the relatively specialized foreign field forces of other departments. The double principle of a combined career Foreign Service was realized in outline by the act of May 24, 1924, which merged the diplomatic and consular services. The act created a service of eight classes and an unclassified grade entered through an examination administered by a State Department board. Candidates, whose age must be between twenty-one and thirty-five, were to take a written examination of several days dura-

tion and, if their grade in this was seventy or above, were to be admitted to an individual oral interview, results of which were reckoned as part of their combined mark.

Appointments (technically made by the President and confirmed by the Senate) were to the service, not to particular posts. The initial assignment was to the unclassified grade. After probationary field tutelage and a short course in the Foreign Service School, the officer was appointed a vice-consul. In addition, persons who had served for five years in executive capacities in the State Department might be appointed to higher grades, but this proviso was administered sparingly.

An important step in advancing the principle of unity was taken in 1939. The Department of Commerce had developed a system of foreign agents under appropriation items dating back to 1905. The scheme was formalized by the act of March 3, 1927. The "Commerce Foreign Service" was established thereby in the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce "consisting of officers to be graded in the following order and to be known as commercial attaches, assistant commercial attaches, trade commissioners, and assistant trade commissioners." Future selections were to be made by examination held by the department and Civil Service Commission in coordination. The salary range was to be roughly comparable to that in the Foreign Service.

Analogous recognition was given to agricultural reporting by a companion measure, approved June 5, 1930. "The present representatives of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics of the Department of Agriculture now stationed abroad," it ran, "shall be officers of the Foreign Agricultural Service of the United States, and the Secretary of Agriculture may appoint other officers in

said service from time to time in accordance with civil-service procedure." Both laws avowed the principle that the specialized services were within the purview of the Department of State and the diplomatic establishments. Thus the act for the Foreign Commerce Service stated that any member thereof "shall, through the Department of State, be regularly and officially attached to the diplomatic mission of the United States in the country in which he is to be stationed" and that "the Secretary of State may reject the name of any such officer if in his judgment the assignment of such officer to the post designated would be prejudicial to the public policy of the United States." Similar stipulations were attached to the Foreign Agricultural Service.

It is doubtful whether the possibility of union in the field was fully explored. A coordination agreement in 1933 limited the scope of the Commerce representatives. Nevertheless the Department of State was increasingly restive about the multiple services. In favor of amalgamation, it was said not only that foreign representation was inalienably a responsibility for the Department of State and its missions, but also that economic and political reporting were hardly separable, especially because trade promotion was coming to rest on conditions that required broad analysis and inter-governmental agreements. The duties of the military and naval attaches were too special to make them valid precedents for the separate existence of commercial and agricultural representatives. The divided field, it was argued, embarrassed the conduct of foreign relations. In these terms the campaign for unity waxed through 1938 and into 1939. The opportunity for a State Department victory came with the coincidence in the latter year of a newly appointed and cooperative Secretary of Commerce and the grant of

power to the President by the Reorganization Act to initiate changes in administrative structure generally. His second reorganization plan merged the Commerce and Agriculture systems in the Foreign Service of the United States.

The merger was sweetened by numerous provisions. Representatives of Commerce and Agriculture were to sit with the Foreign Service personnel board when the merged personnel were involved. Liaison officers were to be stationed in the State Department to be the channel of requests and to ensure prompt transmission of information gathered from the field. The plan spoke also of the commissioning of "specialists and technicians for temporary duty." Many of these provisions remained relatively unused; war conditions intervened before the amalgamation could be fully tried. A serious problem for the future was the fact that, although the merger brought functional elements into the Foreign Service, they were not self-replenishing.

The war closed many posts but necessitated over-all expansion of the Foreign Service. After the 1939 amalgamation there were 719 Foreign Service Officers, against 672 in 1935. By 1944 the number of regular officers had risen to approximately 800.⁴ Wartime needs were met in part by the invention in 1941 of the Auxiliary Foreign Service. Persons deemed to be suitably qualified were admitted by what amounted to examination through interview following evaluation of their education and experience. Supported first by the President's emergency funds, the Auxiliary was carried later by

4. On January 1, 1945, the Foreign Service and its field adjuncts comprised: 792 regular Foreign Service Officers; 500 Auxiliary Foreign Service Officers; 2,005 Foreign Service clerks; 1,071 Auxiliary clerks and other employees; and 1,485 miscellaneous employees—in all 5,906.

regular appropriations but under conditions that limited it to not more than six months beyond the end of the emergency. By the close of 1944 there were approximately 500 Auxiliary Foreign Service Officers, together with some one thousand clerical and other minor Auxiliary personnel.

The Auxiliary was useful in part as a means by which the State Department put specialists in the field. Nearly one-third of the Auxiliary officers had assignments of a specialized or technical character, not counting the large category of economic analysts. The contribution of the Auxiliary is revealed by noting contrasts in connection with assignments for reporting and negotiation on agricultural matters, petroleum, strategic materials, labor relations, cultural relations, press and other information work, finance, and civil aeronautics. Approximately 42 career officers were engaged on these matters in 1941, and 64 at the end of 1944, whereas at the latter date 132 Auxiliary officers were dealing with them.

Meanwhile the pressure for specialized staffing abroad has been reflected in the overseas personnel of agencies other than the State Department. An estimate in the summer of 1944 indicated that nearly ninety per cent of the increase had been outside the Foreign Service. Nearly fifty agencies had representatives abroad. The Office of War Information was credited with slightly above one thousand; the Foreign Economic Administration (including the United States Commercial Company, its trading arm) with nearly that number; the Shipping Administration and the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, with about 300 each; the Office of Censorship, with 61. Among the government corporations, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation proper was represented abroad by 25 agents; the Defense Supplies Corpora-

tion by 137; and the Rubber Reserve Company by 134. The Department of Agriculture had 105; the Federal Communications Commission, 24; the Civil Aeronautics Administration, 21. In addition, the listing included a lump of 983 foreign representatives for miscellaneous United States agencies. The foregoing totals did not include United States emergency employees who were nationals of countries in which they served.

Two avenues of development are open in the future. One method would permit various federal agencies to project themselves abroad but would strive for union at each foreign capital under the hegemony of the diplomatic establishment. The other method would seek to absorb the increasing functional pressures within an enlarged Foreign Service. These alternatives are not exclusive, of course. The question of emphasis in the choice between them, however, is momentous for the future administration of the foreign contacts of the United States.

B

The attempted solution through coordinated action in the field may be considered before discussing how the Foreign Service may be adapted for diverse special tasks. In wartime the possibility of working union has been illustrated at a number of posts. The Foreign Service has obvious advantages in seeking the role of leadership abroad. None challenges the need for some degree of subordination to the head of the diplomatic mission on the part of every agency. In any case, the State Department's control of passports and of the "pouch" would require deference. All concede the importance of respecting the role of the ambassador or minister in political matters; such, indeed, may be involved in the opening of negotiations even on technical matters. The practical is-

sues of a federated field structure raise, not the broad question of ultimate superiority, but rather the formula under which the representatives of separate agencies may fulfill a double responsibility without friction. A formula conduces to day-to-day smoothness although its realization rests on the personal force, tact, and administrative aptitude of the head of the diplomatic establishment.

Wartime experience has been suggestive as to arrangements. Illustrative are the terms of the "agreement between the Department of State and the Foreign Economic Administration concerning economic programs abroad" signed by the two agencies in November, 1943. Its basic assumption was set forth in the introductory paragraph, as follows: "The chief State Department representatives abroad, being the officers through whom relations with foreign governments are conducted, have general authority, within the area of their jurisdiction, over the representatives of other civilian agencies and their activities." On the other hand, it was agreed that

subject to the general authority of the principal State Department representative, the chief representative of the FEA in a country or area will direct the work of all members and employees of his staff and all persons temporarily attached to it. The principal State Department representative will recognize the responsibility of the FEA staff for the actual conduct of its operations and he will concern himself directly with these operations only to the extent of determining that they are carried on in conformity with the foreign policy.

Within the foregoing general frame, the agreement sought to anticipate the problems of relationship under a dozen headings. On the often troublesome matter of passports, for example, it was stipulated that they must be issued to FEA representatives within two weeks after application "unless the State Department files a written

statement setting forth its reasons for opposing the assignment or unless refusal of a passport is based upon security reasons." On the ticklish question of communications, it was said that "all FEA cables will be transmitted through State Department cable facilities unless otherwise determined, e.g., as in the case of military operation." Copies of all communications to and from FEA were to be given to the State Department and its principal field representative. In the practical conduct of business with other governments, representation and especially negotiation are the acute points of State Department concern. The agreement sought to preserve the paramount position of the Foreign Service, while permitting ancillary operating contacts. "In a country or area for which he is responsible," it was stated, "the principal State Department representative will initiate with foreign governments general economic negotiations pertaining to operations of the FEA only after prior consultation with the latter's chief representative, who will be taken into the negotiations." After the conclusion of general negotiations resulting in master or country agreements for the development or procurement of commodities, for example, it was promised that the FEA representative would have wide latitude to conduct negotiations "for the purpose of implementing such general agreements or programs," including all negotiations with private firms or individuals. The State Department representative would have the privilege of accompanying him. In the case of disagreement in the field, each representative might communicate with his home agency, preferably in a consolidated document as the basis for consultation in Washington.

The agreement between the State Department and the Foreign Economic Administration contemplated even

closer forms of union, including dual status for the FEA agent whereby he served as an assistant to the chief diplomatic representative. The relationships possible in wartime were variant and changing. Effective union, moreover, involved other agencies than the FEA. Their range in economic matters was illustrated in the Mission for Economic Affairs in London (MEA). This relatively comprehensive and successful instance of federated field structure was established in matured form by a letter on October 19, 1943 from the President to Philip D. Reed, saying: "You are hereby appointed Chief of the Mission for Economic Affairs in London with the rank of Minister. You will be a member of Ambassador Winant's staff and, subject to his general control and supervision, you will be responsible for such foreign economic affairs as the Ambassador or the State Department may request you to undertake." The letter stated that the work of MEA included "representation of and direct responsibility to the FEA, . . . the War Shipping Administration, the War Food Administration, the War Production Board, the Petroleum Administration for War, and other American agencies...." At the same time, the chief representative of the Office of War Information for Britain acted as the Ambassador's assistant in public relations. As liberation proceeded and missions were sent abroad looking to the reopening of regular diplomatic establishments, the tendency was to designate the FEA agents jointly and to assimilate them organically to the chief State Department representatives.

But union may be a poor substitute for unity. The case for the latter is especially strong in foreign affairs. It can be argued that governmental activities abroad will not be so diverse nor so detailed and technical as to prevent the attempt to obtain the coordinated field organiza-

tion longed for at home but precluded by the variety and scale of domestic operations. In addition, specialized international bodies are likely to provide channels for many intergovernmental relationships. Certainly, so far as direct national representation abroad is required, every effort should be made to provide it within a single omnibus field structure. To say this answers nothing; it merely raises the question of the second alternative previously mentioned, which involves functionalization in the Foreign Service itself.

C

The Foreign Service views itself, at least potentially, as the closely knit but flexible field agency for the United States government as a whole. Its advocates insist that the crucial responsibilities of foreign representation and reporting (including especially negotiation, on the one hand, and the appraisal of political and general economic conditions, on the other) must be left in the hands of the Foreign Service. Yet these advocates admit that functional pressures are growing and must be accommodated. Can the Foreign Service be sufficiently specialized, without destroying its integrity and its mobility, to minimize, if not to avoid altogether, the multiplication of permanent overseas field staffs?

The functional specialties already admitted to have claims for attention within the Foreign Service include the following subjects: aviation, telecommunications, mining, petroleum, commodity controls, financial matters, shipping, labor conditions, cultural cooperation, and the informational media of the press, radio, and motion pictures. In staffing for the needs indicated by such a list, no single prescription would be realistic. A preliminary State Department survey in 1944 suggested that the

positions needed in the future should be thought of in categories corresponding to increasing degrees of specialization. First come those that could be filled by Foreign Service Officers after relatively short periods of training in which to acquire the special knowledge required. Second come positions within the competence of Foreign Service Officers if they gave major attention to the specialties involved for a considerable time and perhaps took graduate instruction or secured cognate outside experience. Third come positions that could be filled only by Foreign Service Officers who had specialized training and experience and were allowed to devote themselves exclusively to specialized subjects during most of their careers, with opportunities also for graduate study and for ways of keeping up to date about their particular fields. Fourth come positions that probably could not be filled by regular Foreign Service Officers because the specialization would be so intense that members of the Service would hardly choose it or because it would require a degree of professional or business achievement that career Officers would not have an opportunity to attain.

Anticipating the time when the wartime Auxiliary will no longer be available as an expedient of temporary expansion and specialization, the Foreign Service must be adapted in important respects. It is likely that the basic act of 1924 will be subjected to thorough scrutiny and revision. Meanwhile, tentative and partial steps have been taken. A prominent motive behind recent proposals was reflected in the statement by the Acting Secretary in February, 1944, which accompanied a draft measure for Congress: "... new and unprecedented personal requirements in the field call for the services of a greater number of specially trained technicians than can be developed

within the Foreign Service as presently organized.”⁵ Among other changes in the law, the bill proposed to admit to the regular Foreign Service by qualifying examination, and at appropriate levels above the ordinary starting grade, recruits from four sources, including especially members of the Auxiliary and persons who had served for ten years or more in one of the departments. The permission was narrowly hedged, for it was limited to a year and the total additions to the permanent Foreign Service accomplished under it could not exceed five per cent of the whole number.

Limited though the measure was, the proposal caused anxiety among many members of the Foreign Service. They purported to see in it a blow at the non-political career system. They feared that it would undermine further the already sagging morale of the Service. Some thought that it might prove a handicap to the able personnel who had won their way into the Foreign Service by competitive examination after 1924 and who were just reaching their fullest usefulness. Especially career critics of the measure argued that the proposals for the recruitment of specialists underestimated the adaptability of the seasoned generalists who constitute the bulk of the Foreign Service and disregarded the possibilities of in-service training.

The modified bill enacted in 1945 was even more restricted. Gone were the provisions that would have allowed permanent accretions to the Foreign Service at

5. 78th Congress, 2nd Session, House Document No. 457, February 29, 1944. In revised form the measure was introduced on May 31, 1944, as H. R. 4902. Still further amended, it was reintroduced in the 79th Congress, 1st Session, as H. R. 689, passed, and approved on May 3, 1945 as Public Law 48.

the higher levels.⁶ The bill did permit persons who had been employed for at least five years by other agencies to be assigned to the Foreign Service for periods up to four years. Thus revised, the measure promised to be chiefly useful by improving opportunities among the administrative personnel attached to the Foreign Service and by repealing the statutory percentage limitations on the size of the higher Foreign Service classes which had been choking promotions.

Meanwhile, as evidence of awareness of an unsolved problem of specialization within the Foreign Service, there was talk of a "Foreign Service Reserve." It would consist of a panel of many hundreds of business and professional men who, having indicated their availability for limited periods of service, would be approved as eligible by the Secretary of State and assigned potentially to Foreign Service grades warranted by their age and experience. Such reserve personnel would be used especially for spot assignments too technical in nature to be handled by Foreign Service Officers even when relatively specialized. Little could be said against the scheme except to note the double risk that Reserve officers, if used at all, might be slighted by the regulars, while the theoretical existence of the Reserve might dry up the movement for a fundamental and internal attack on the problem of functional needs, including a reconsideration both of the law and of its administration.

An improved administration of the law may well include more consciously propaedeutic assignments, with

6. The examination in March, 1945, for permanent admission to the Foreign Service was for recruitment at the entrance level and was confined to persons already employed in the Department of State or in the Auxiliary Foreign Service. The examination announced later in 1945 was open only to persons in military service; it likewise was for admission at the entrance grade.

emphasis upon broadening experience in early years and specialization after thirty. In-service training bids fair to become continuous. In the past the Foreign Service School was limited to a few weeks of instruction during the probationary period, mostly about procedures. In 1906 intensive language field training began with Chinese and Japanese; it was extended to Russian and Arabic in 1928. But language training is areal, not functional. The post-entry study of economics came a little later. The application of the trade agreements policy after 1934 helped to lift the technique of foreign trade promotion from opportunities for individual exporters to more general considerations. Many Foreign Service Officers were attracted to economic analysis. Between 1937 and 1942 eleven Foreign Service Officers were sent for a year of graduate study in various universities. To mention these stirrings, however, emphasizes how little of what is possible has been done to ensure suitable admixtures of functionalized training within the career Service itself. An extended in-service training program is now being inaugurated under the new Division of Foreign Training Services.

Specialization abroad reacts at home upon the relation of functional and areal organization. A heavy responsibility falls upon the functional divisions of the State Department in deciding when specialists are needed, in setting standards for their selection, in shaping their training, and in formulating instructions for their guidance in the field. The functional units must inevitably be sources or channels for secondary streams of instructions to the diplomatic establishments. This responsibility must be tactfully asserted in the face of the just claim of the geographical offices to be prime guardians of the gates to the field, while the administrative offices of the de-

partment provide managerial oversight and assistance. At the same time the functional units must draw much of the substance of their suggestions from outside agencies like the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor.

III

The theme of function and its interplay with geography leads to the relationship of specialized to general forms of international organization and of both to the divisions of the Department of State and to other national departments. It has happily become obsolete to labor the question whether in approaching world organization the emphasis in priority should be upon a general security organization or upon functional associations. Superseded, too, are many issues about the wisdom of affiliating special bodies to the general organization. Such doubts seemed more important when the adherence of the United States to a general security organization seemed uncertain. But the conduct of relations with various types of international structures has important implications for domestic administration.

Under the principles agreed to at San Francisco, the main coercive task of the United Nations Organization is to prevent the outbreak of aggression by the concert of force. This is the especial concern of the Security Council, in which the influence of the great nations that contribute decisive aid is heavily weighted. The distinctive opportunity of the essentially advisory Assembly, representing all states equally, is to cultivate conditions that predispose toward well-being and peace. The duties of the Assembly involve stimulative and coordinative relations with an indefinite number of international bodies of a functional nature, some of which may have limit-

ed but solid operating powers.⁷ The role of stimulation and coordination is to be accomplished by the Assembly mainly through an Economic and Social Council, supplemented by expert commissions. The nexus of the functional bodies to the main organization is left flexible. The Charter of the United Nations (Article 57) states: "The various specialized agencies established by inter-governmental agreement and having wide international responsibilities, as defined in their basic instruments, in economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related fields, shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 63." The latter provision directs that "The Economic and Social Council may enter into agreements with any of the agencies referred to. . . Such agreements shall be subject to approval by the General Assembly."

As to future relations to the several parts of the United States government, a few comments will show the elements to be harmonized. First, as already mentioned, the State Department has already created an office that will be especially concerned with relations to the Security Council and the Assembly of the United Nations Organization. Within the Office of Special Political Affairs the Division of International Organization Affairs will deal

7. Over 140 international unions or other bodies of specialized character were listed in 1944, with a score of others in course of establishment or actively proposed. Of the number mentioned, 60 were classified as social and cultural, 82 as economic. Twenty-five were connected in some way with the League of Nations. Twenty-five were Pan-American. Among the formative bodies were the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, and an agency concerned with educational reconstruction and cultural relations. Bruited also was the rebuilding from older elements of a world health organization and there was a talk of international agencies for commodity agreements, trade regulations, trade practices, security issues, aviation, shipping, and the like.

with structural problems, including advice on the interlocking of functional and regional bodies with the over-all organization. The Division of International Security Affairs, presumably, will be crucially responsible at the working level of the department for questions that rise to the plane of global security. Since the sore points that disturb international security are likely to begin as localized frictions, it remains to be demonstrated in practice at what point an issue will be lifted from the regional jurisdiction of a geographical office to the over-all division on security matters. Here is a prime need in the evolution of foreign offices. The gravity of the problem is increased by the relationships that must exist with the joint chiefs of staff, tied into the Military Staff Committee of the Security Council of the United Nations.

In economic and social matters, the substance of State Department policy in dealing with the galaxy of specialized international organizations belongs in the first instance to the functional divisions that deal with financial affairs, commercial policy, labor relations, aviation, cultural cooperation, and so forth. Such divisions, in turn, are contact points for suggestions from agencies like the Treasury, the Labor Department, the Civil Aeronautics Administration, etc. On many matters the role of the corresponding specialized State Department units is essentially coordinative. In the current handling of policy they are supplemented by the general State Department machinery for the servicing of international conferences. The Division of International Organization Affairs is incidentally concerned about the structural relationships among the organizations themselves, especially the linkage of the special bodies to the general world organization. But the substance of the matters under discussion remains with the functional units unless taken to the

highest policy counsels of the department or of the government as a whole. Regionalized international bodies introduce further interlocking of jurisdictions. Here the geographical offices are closely involved. In the degree to which regional organizations are specialized, however, the corresponding functional division in the State Department must carry the preparatory responsibility for substance.

In conclusion, it is enough to hope that the survey of three clusters of relationships in national organization for the conduct of international affairs has shown how insistent and how single in essence are the varied needs to adjust function and area. The functional claims for attention are sound. Their recognition, however, increases the importance of the synthesis which typically must be provided around the core of area. Nor does the inevitability of functionalization in the field render unity there less desirable. The price is the accommodation of the Foreign Service to specialized needs. Ultimately the prerequisite for concert among the impinging functional factors is the coherence of foreign policy which is implied in the position of Secretary of State but which is still to be realized in the development of national administration.